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The sprawling institutions of the U.N.1 are the major 
sources of a modern international law.  They generate a 
bewildering variety of treaties which are opened for nation-states 
to sign (although subsequent implementation and enforcement are 
much more problematic), as well as create reams of international 
“soft” and customary law.2 Founded sixty years ago, more or less, 
and now facing mid-life crises, the U.N. sought to reform itself 
through initiatives that responded to perceived crises.  This process 
came to a head at the September 2005 World Summit, and this 
article seeks to explain why these initiatives largely failed, why 
 
* Presented to the Comparative Constitutionalism and Rights 
Conference, Dec. 10-13, 2005, Durban, South Africa. 
** Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law; B.A. Lake Forest, 
J.D. Wisconsin, and Ph.D. London; Paul.Brietzke@valpo.edu.
Comments and criticisms are welcome. 
1 See Roger Coate, U.N. World Summit Set to Begin, WASHINGTON 
POST, Sept. 14, 2005, 2 PM (all POST articles read off 
<WashingtonPost.com>.  The U.N. is a “family” of intergovernmental 
agencies: the International Labour Organisation, the World Bank, the 
World Trade Organization, etc. etc.  Reform must thus be seen as 
systemic, “not just tinkering with things in New York.”  Id. 
2 Paul Brietzke, Insurgents in the ‘New’ International Law, 13 WIS.
INT. L. J. 1 (1995). 
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international law thus remains mostly unchanged.  A poker-like 
model is adapted to explain U.N. processes.3 The 2005 reform 
initiatives are then analyzed with the help of this model4, with 
particular attention being paid to human rights (non-)reforms and 
(the lack of) progress over implementing the Millennium 
Development Goals.5 Assuming that this degree of reform failure 
is undesirable, at least on balance, some remedies are then 
discussed.6
Four interrelated definitions of international law will be 
used in this article.  Ideally, international law (and the other 
functions of the U.N.) seeks to enhance security and a human 
dignity/capability.  Second, international law  seeks to implement a 
seeming paradox: global governance without a global government, 
able to harmonize, integrate, and enforce laws and policies.7 Such 
arrangements create what economists call “collective action 
problems”8, and analogies to such arrangements can be seen in the 
long history of Islamic or Judaic law and (by anthropologists) 
 
3 See notes ___ and accompanying text, infra. 
4 See notes ___ and accompanying text, infra. 
5 See notes ___ and accompanying text, infra.  I will follow precedent 
set by Philip Alston _____________, and reproduce the Millennium 
Development Goals in the Appendix.  
6 See notes ____ and accompanying text, infra.
7 JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 21 
(2002); Paul Brietzke, Globalization, Nationalism, & Human Rights, ___ 
U. FLA. J. INT. L. ___ (2006). See Tony Evans, International Human 
Rights Law as Power/Knowledge, 22 H. RTS. Q. 1046, 1054 (2005) 
(“discipline” as social organization without the need for coercion, “a 
form of modernist power”); id. at 1065 (pessimists quote investment 
banker Robert Hormats—the “great beauty of globalization is that no one 
is in control.”).  The argument at 1054 shows Evans is British, since it 
was first used by the poet Mathew Arnold when he was also Headmaster 
of Rugby School (where the sport of loosely-organized mayhem 
originated).  It later formed the ideology of British colonialism in Africa: 
governance with the fewest resources possible, sometimes called Indirect 
Rule. 
8 Eric Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach (2005) (Olin 
L. & Econ. Pap. 2d, No. 256 & SSRN 811554); John Yoo, Force rules: 
U.N. Reform & Intervention (2005) (Berkeley Pub. L. & Res. Pap.)  
(Both articles can be downloaded from <SSRN.com>). 
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among indigenous groups who lack formal rulers and thus live by 
reciprocal observances of rules.9 Third, while the profits from an 
economic globalization can usually be appropriated by particular 
corporations or countries, most of the rest of international law 
seeks to create “public goods”: human rights, peace, development, 
a healthy environment, etc.  These goods belong to everyone, and 
no one (other than an altruist) wants to bear the costs of pursuing 
them; unlike profits from an economic globalization, they cannot 
be appropriated for the pursuer’s sole benefit in the short run.  
Another set of collective action problems, or “market failures”, 
arise from the resulting under-supply of these public goods; none 
but altruists will pursue them in the poker games to be described, 
except when these public goods serve some other game purpose.  
In other words, everyone wants to win even more by being a “free 
rider”, who reaps good things paid for by others.10 Fourth, 
international law provides the rules for the poker games that will 
be described.  These games are about access to, and a measure of 
control over, an interchangeable wealth and power pursued 
through legal (and other) processes.11 
THE GAMES’ AFOOT 
To paraphrase William Blake, I must either create my own 
model or be dominated by someone else’s.12 However, the reader 
is promised that taking the time to understand my poker model will 
yield important insights not readily available in other ways.  
Anyone who analyzes the international law produced by the U.N. 
necessarily uses an explicit or implicit model, if only to tame the 
intractability of the material.  For example, two game theorists13 
9 Brietzke, supra note 7. 
10 Id.; Posner, supra note 8; Yoo, supra note 8.  Posner, id., offers an 
example: even if all countries would have been better off if genocide in 
Rwanda has been stopped, each country would have been even better off 
if other countries bore the considerable risks and costs of procuring this 
stop.  (This is like using other people’s money to play poker, while 
keeping any winnings for yourself). 
11 Brietzke, supra note 7, from which the model to be presented has 
been adapted. 
12 Regrettably, I have lost the source of this quote. 
13 I.e., the American Thomas Schelling and the Israeli Robert Aumann.  
See The Trade Game, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005 (all L.A. TIMES articles 
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won the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics for modeling a relatively 
well-known means of conflict management, which grew out of the 
(bipolar, in both senses) Cold War.  Inevitably under such models, 
even sharp competitions must take place within a cooperative 
framework, so that a game does not end in the violent conflict that 
spawns international anarchy.  Building trust and collaborations 
through small compromises proves the most fruitful path, since 
you can always punish uncooperative players (perceived defectors) 
in subsequent rounds of play ("hands” of poker). 14 Briefing the 
U.S. House International Relations Committee, Deputy Secretary 
General Mark Malloch Brown argues that U.N. reform “has to be 
the work of a coalition, and holding that coalition together is the 
surest way to success.”15 
Our topic—multidimensional and interrelated disputes and 
needs, occurring in many geographic and subject matter areas at 
the same time—is far too complex16 to be modeled as the two-
person, one-subject game described in the last paragraph.  
Likewise, there are few “economies of scale in a [legal] rule 
specific enough unambiguously to govern a decision; over time, 
the increasingly-difficult question becomes which of these 
proliferating specific rules resolves a particular dispute with some  
degree of flexibility.”17 This complexity, and the uncertainty it 
inevitably breeds, are not products of an international anarchy.  A 
 
are read off <LATimes.com>); War Games, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 
2005, 82. 
14 Brietzke, supra note 7; The Trade Game, supra note 13 (modeling 
the Doha round of WTO trade negotiations); War Games, supra note 13. 
15 Mark M. Brown, Briefing to the House International Relations 
Committee, Sept. 28, 2005 (transcript available at <unfoundation.org>. 
16 Coate, supra note 1;  Alberto Romulo, The United Nations and the 
Building of a Better World, MANILA TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005 (Philippines 
Foreign Affairs Secretary) (read off <manilatimes.net>).  See MARK 
TAYLOR, THE MANAGEMENT OF COMPLEXITY: EMERGING NETWORK 
CULTURE 3 (2001) (we’re in an “era of unprecedented complexity, when 
things are changing faster than our ability to comprehend them.”); id. at 
13 (we are far from equilibrium, at the edge of chaos under complexity 
theory; all significant change occurs in the area lying between too much 
and too little order). 
17 Andrew Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: 
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. INT’L
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more nuanced view of governance is required: a search for fairly 
stable “rules of the road” rather than an automatic, Hobbesian18 
recourse to coercion—which is usually too costly these days, for a 
variety of reasons. 
 The need for cooperation and coordination during a 
bargaining can often be met, even in the absence of a developed 
global state, because the truly significant international “players” 
are few in number.  They are five in fact, and they constitute what 
economists might call a “loose oligopoly”: the U.S., Russia, China, 
the European Union, and the U.N. itself.  (The latter two act as 
major players only when members coordinate their 
communications, power and resources effectively—something the 
other majors can usually take for granted, although Congress 
sometimes speaks in a different voice from that of the President for 
example.)  The very existence of the game (described infra) shows 
that, unlike a globalized economy or science for example, politics 
still recognizes and informally operates through nation-state 
boundaries that define the “players”, through the sovereignty that 
still proves both inevitable and necessary in international law and 
relations.  Thus the game fosters recognition that both the 
successes and the failures of the U.N. and of its international law 
are those of interacting nation-states.  The game offers some 
solutions to economists’ “collective action problems,” and to 
dealing with “public goods” and “free rider” problems that are 
stimulated by the existence of very high “transaction costs” in 
 
L. 639, 641, 644 (1998); Werner Hirsch, Reducing Laws Uncertainly and 
Complexity, U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1233 (1974).  See MICHAEL KING &
CHRIS THORNHILL, NIKLAS LUHMANN’S THEORY OF POLITICS AND LAW 
(discussing Luhmann’s analyses), id. at 285 (“awareness of complexity” 
eclipses the claim that the problems of the world can be worked out 
logically or even theoretically.”); id. at 286 (“the pressure for action 
often cuts short the search for knowledge short.”); NIKLAS LUHMANN,
OBSERVATIONS ON MODERNITY 27, 67-68 (1998); Paul Blustein, U.S. 
Free Trade Deals Include Few Muslim Countries, WASHINGTON POST,
Dec. 3, 2004, E1; Nobles & Schiff, supra note 8, at 50; Exclusive, THE 
ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 2004, 78. 
18 In the sense that Hobbes’ state of nature is sometimes evident in 
global society.  He assumed that we would agree to Leviathan under such 
a SON, but global society is too complex and too democratic in parts for 
such a consensus to emerge.  See text accompanying notes ___, infra. 
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international relations.  The resulting outcomes are necessarily too 
complex to be captured by simpler versions of economists’ game 
theory.19 
The global relations of the five major players play out 
against a backdrop of what economists might call a “competitive 
fringe”: the many countries that are too relatively poor and/or 
powerless to effect outcomes much overall.  Their role is usually 
supportive of consensus among some or all of the five major 
players.  This tactic minimizes the antagonizing of major players 
and perhaps provoking their retaliation, and it gives the minor 
players a sense of inclusion in, and a “soft” power through, 
international law and relations.  Some of these many countries 
have a situational or geographical power with regard to particular 
issues, a power which forces the majors to take them into account 
for some purposes: Saudi Arabia’s oil and its funding of Islamic 
fundamentalism in many Muslim countries20 or India and Pakistan 
in relation to Kashmir, for example.  
 A helpful extended analogy illustrating this small group 
behavior has us imagining the five majors playing global poker 
games.21 They have played together for so long that each is aware 
 
19 Michael Glennon, Idealism That Won’t Work (2005) (SSRN Paper 
No. ____); Douglas Snidal, Political Economy and International 
Institutions, 16 INT’L REV. L. & EC. 121, 126-28 (1996).  See THOMAS 
JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON 
TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 149, 156 (2000); Richard 
Nobles & David Schiff, Introduction, in NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A 
SOCIAL SYSTEM 1, 49 (2004) (discussing Luhmann’s ideas); notes 13-16 
and accompanying text, supra.
20 Saudi Arabia was a good counter to Egypt’s Nasser and then 
Saddam, and a surrogate after the Shah of Iran was overthrown.  But the 
U.S. inability to wean itself off cheap oil, and corrupting contacts 
between U.S. and Saudi elites blinded the U.S. to the Saudi nurturing of 
a militant anti-Westernism—including that of Al Qaeda, and the 
alienation of its own subjects and freedom lovers generally.  Milton 
Viorst, Desert Storms, THE NATION, Sept. 26, 2005, 31. 
21 See JAMES KOCH, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PRICES 268-69 
(1974); F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 165 (1970); supra note 108, at 268-69; 
SCHERER, supra note 108, at 165; DAVID SKLANSKY, THE THEORY OF 
POKER (4th ed. 2005); HOYLE’S RULES OF GAMES 241-79 (Albert 
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of the past behavior patterns of the others, although the styles of 
play from some new player-representatives—Bush/Bolton or 
Putin, for example—can disrupt the game (infra).  In particular, 
each player has views about the strengths and weaknesses of its 
own play, and especially about the reactions other players will 
have to its own projected actions.  Unlike chess, poker is played at 
speed and player information is seriously incomplete.  Players try 
to fill informational gaps by evaluating opponents’ behavior, while 
attempting to conceal the significance of their own behavior: in 
other words, practising good diplomacy.  (In contrast, Bush 
telegraphs tactics in his speeches.)22 These anticipated reactions 
affect the players’ actions in turn. 
 The barriers to becoming a major player are huge, which is 
just the way incumbent major players want to keep it.  Such 
conditions hold sway even if other seats around the poker table (up 
to a total of eight, say, although up to ten can play 5-card stud) are 
filled by temporary players: e.g., Japan and North and South 
Korea, but not the U.N. for the most part, during six-sided 
negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.  The range of 
feasible outcomes from any given “hand” (round of play) is 
reduced markedly by such particular players’ predilections, but the 
actual outcome is still indeterminate because of unforeseen events 
which are external to the game and because information is 
imperfect: who has which cards (or which “hole” card(s), if “stud” 
poker is being played) and how these cards will be played, for 
example.   
 
Morehead & Geoffrey Mott-Smith, eds., 3d., rev. ed. 2001).  The ideal 
analogy to oligopoly would: define the number of actors and account for 
procedures, asymmetries (especially of information and a limited 
understanding of political and economic forces), the ways expectations 
are conveyed, an uncertainty of outcomes, and the managing of 
cooperation.  See JACKSON, supra note 17, at 18, 42, 156; Snidal, supra 
note 19, at 123-24.  The poker game analogy arguably satisfies these 
criteria. 
22 SKLANSKY, supra note 21, at 17, 245.  See HOYLE’S, supra note 21, 
at 267; Marking the Dealer’s Cards, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 2005, 92 
(Friedrich Hayek saw the economy running on “dispersed bits of 
incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge” communicated to 
everyone through shifts in market prices—or bets in the poker model). 
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North Korea’s nukes offer a useful example here.  While 
Russia has been rather inactive, China has bet the most and has the 
biggest stake in the matter—rivaling North Korea’s stake, even.  
Resolving this dispute would greatly enhance Chinese prestige, by 
helping to convert its growing economic power into a geopolitical 
power.  China has leverage, controlling 30% of North Korea’s food 
and more than 70% of its fuel, but China also has the most to lose: 
the collapse of the North Korean regime would flood China with 
many stability-endangering refugees.  South Korea’s style of play 
has changed, from fear to an ambiguous pity for brethren who 
could never be absorbed economically, through reunification.  U.S. 
game-play is difficult to evaluate.  Like China (and Russia, infra), 
North Korea threatens U.S. military dominance in the region, and 
poses a diffuse threat to a valued ally, Japan (but probably not 
South Korea), yet Japan seems only mildly concerned.  Above all, 
mutual incomprehension and translation difficulties plague the 
course of play against each other by the U.S. and North Korea.  It 
is thus difficult to know the outcome from quite a few “hands” 
(rounds of play): who won and lost what?  Was some agreement 
reached and, if so, what are its terms?  Does it include a light-water 
reactor for North Korea?23 Above all, have global concerns over a 
nuclear proliferation gotten lost during the heat of play—perhaps 
because U.N. involvement has been mostly limited to providing 
food aid to North Korea? 
 Poker player-representatives are nation-state leaders or 
their appointees, who thus play poker with others’ (taxpayers, etc.) 
interchangeable wealth and power.  Their style of play is thus less 
cautious than it would be if players were investing their personal 
 
23 Philip Bowring, Modeling Korean Unification, INT. HERALD TRIB., 
Sept. 27, 2005 (read off Internet); Joseph Kahn, North Korea Sets New 
Demand for Ending Arms Program, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005 (all 
TIMES articles are read off <NYTimes.com>.  Glenn Kessler, What That 
Accord Really Says, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 25, 2005, B2 (all POST 
articles are read off <washingtonpost.com>); Tong Kim, You Say 
Okjeryok, I Say Deterrent, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 25, 2005, B1; 
Charles Krauthammer, China’s Moment, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 23, 
2005, A23; The Deal That Wasn’t, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 2005, 49; 
North Korea Rejects UN Food Aid, Sept. 23, 2005, 2140 GMT (read off 
<BBCNews.com>). 
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wealth and power in the game.  The playwright David Mamet 
displays a deep understanding of poker while modeling 
contemporary American politics.24 For Mamet, the only way to 
win, to seize the initiative, is to “raise” (bet more than the other 
players during the current betting round).  But if you have never 
raised before, the other players will simply “fold” (leave the game, 
and leave you as the winner of relatively little; this is the tactic 
today’s Democrats use in the U.S.).  On the other hand, an excess 
of your past raises in poker (a Bushian over-aggressiveness, for 
example) makes the other players suspicious.  One or several will 
likely “call your bluff” by matching or raising your own raise(s), 
thus forcing you to show your cards.  But if you don’t raise, you 
will “ante” your life away (pay the minimum necessary to play 
each hand) and go home broke.  Mamet concludes that there is no 
certainty in poker, only likelihood, and “the likelihood is that 
aggression will prevail.”25 
Over time, the “luck of the draw” (the cards you get in a 
particular hand) evens out, so success or failure turns on how well 
you play all of the hands—or perhaps on how unobtrusively you 
cheat; cheaters are shunned or worse, however.  Players can set 
their own ethical standards but, generally, anything short of 
cheating—e.g., deviousness or deceit—is acceptable.  Partnerships 
among players are contrary to the spirit of the game yet (like 
bidders’ rings at auctions) difficult to detect.  The “cards speak for 
themselves”, and players who have not dropped out must show 
theirs—providing information on their style of play to the others.26 
David Sklansky adds: “rarely if ever is a particular play always 
right or always wrong.  Your play is affected by the size of the pot 
{the money-backed chips to be won, lying in the middle of the 
table}, your position {whether you bet relatively early or relatively 
late during a round}, the amount of money they have and you 
 
24 See David Mamet, Poker Party, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005. 
25 Id.  But see also SKLANSKY, supra note 21, at 87, 121, 136 (a raise 
should be a rare ploy to obtain information or when you expect greater 
subsequent improvement in your hand than your opponents will have); 
id. at 133 (“raising is often a better alternative than folding, with calling 
the worst of the three.”) 
26 Id. at 137; HOYLE’S, supra note 21, at 250, 266. 
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have, the flow of the game, and other, more subtle factors.”27 A
simple game thus becomes quite complex when played by experts.  
Consider a decision over “bluffing” (betting when you have no 
chance to win if your bet is “called”) versus betting a fair hand for 
value, where both plays may be appropriate and it is almost never 
right to do neither.  The decision turns on your view of your 
opponents, and the self-image you want to project for the future: 
you may want to be “caught” bluffing, to earn even more money 
later on a good hand because opponents think you are bluffing 
again.  Those who never bluff or bluff too much become losers.28 
As a poker player, the Bush Administration bluffs 
excessively and in a particular way, by acting like a “plunger.”  
With more wealth, military power, etc., than any other player, the 
U.S. bets high at every opportunity, to drive opponents out of the 
hand (force them to “fold” because they lack the wealth and power 
consistently to challenge the U.S.), and perhaps out of the entire 
game.  The outcome, regardless of the cards the U.S. holds, is 
more “pots” for it since some opponents with better cards will 
“fold.”  These pots are smaller, however, because some or many 
potential bettors have been driven out earlier.  Expert players with 
adequate resources love a plunger like the U.S., relying on it to 
subsidize their lifestyles: consider Israel and Egypt, reaping huge 
foreign and especially military aid “pots,” even though they have 
nowhere else to go or other viable modes of play.  They even seem 
to provoke additional bluffs from the U.S. (which they will 
cheerfully “call”) by praising American sloppiness: betting heavily 
on a dubious Mideast “democracy” while supporting autocrats, for 
example.29 Unless the developing minor players are very skilled, 
their play is often desperate, since they are playing with money 
provided (under tight strictures) by the IMF, the World Bank, etc.  
 
27 SKLANSKY, supra note 21, at 172-73. 
28 Id. at 164, 173-76. 
29 E.g., the November 2005 Forum for the Future in Bahrain, the 
conference/centerpiece of Bush’s Middle Eastern democracy initiative, 
collapsed over “Egypt’s insistence that Arab governments should have 
more control over grants from a new {U.S.} fund designed to help local 
pro-democracy groups.”  William Fisher, Forum for the (Distant) Future, 
IPS, Nov. 28, 2005. 
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Some of this money originally comes from the U.S. which, in this 
sense, is playing against itself. 
 In sum, the Bush Administration plays by a failed (perhaps 
neoconservative or imperialist) formula, rather than adjust its play 
according to who the relevant players are and the structure of the 
particular game being played: e.g., the size of the ante and the 
betting rules.  In contrast, good players are intentionally 
inconsistent—bluffing randomly and even seeming to blunder on 
occasion, in ways which can often be assembled into a winning 
strategy later.  This is especially effective if it is combined with 
disparaging, distracting, and/or confusing talk: consider Fisher 
playing chess with Spassky or Khrushchev playing almost 
anybody.  If you are a good player, you know what your opponents 
think your cards are, and what your opponents think you think their 
cards are.30 The Bush Administration cannot be troubled with such 
niceties of the game, or even with getting to know their opponents: 
simply deem the North Koreans “inscrutable” for example, and 
you will likely lose. 
 Analytically, the most important point is that the major 
poker players recognize their interdependence, which makes the 
course of play less fun but more predictable.  Economists might 
call the major players’ an “oligopolistic interdependence,” to 
reflect the absence of consistent collusion among the majors.  Each 
major wants to “win” each hand for itself of course, perhaps with 
each major defining what amounts to a win somewhat differently, 
and each is keen to avoid the huge costs of monitoring the others’ 
opportunistic defections from a more formal “cartel.”  
(Interdependence does not necessarily mean stability, in the sense 
of an inherent tendency toward some equilibrium.) 
But even more important than winning for the majors is to not lose 
in certain ways: they seek “minimax” solutions while avoiding war 
or some other painful (costly) disaster.  Disastrous examples  
would include the Zimmermann Telegram that helped to spur 
World War I, and putative weapons of mass destruction (W.M.D.) 
in 21st Century Iraq.  Saddam offered a puzzle to the gamers, by 
giving only the most grudging cooperation to U.N. weapons 
 
30 See id. at 149; id. at 152 (“Many aggressive players … steal money 
with bluffs”, etc. “but when they get a decent hand, they wind up 
losing.”); id. at ____. 
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inspectors when he had no W.M.D.  Did he want to conceal the 
humiliating fact that he had nothing to hide31—a hubris surpassing 
even that of Zimbabwe’s Mugabe? 
 Players recognize that the safest way to avoid disaster 
while playing to win is to play by “liberal internationalism” rules, 
for want of a better description for ‘advanced poker’ or the anti-
Hobbesian rules of the road.  Ordinary poker is a zero-sum game, 
winners benefit only at the expense of losers, while (an imaginary) 
‘advanced poker’ is played in positive-sum ways: all or most major 
and minor players benefiting from a particular game, through 
cooperation and coordination.   Over time, the players display an 
enhanced trust, sense of injustice—particularly but not only as it 
affects themselves, and even self-denial on occasion.  This is 
especially true when a public (“non-rival”) good can be won—
your use of it does not interfere with my use—and reaches a peak 
over “network effects”: the more people who act in the same way 
(use Microsoft Windows or act in accord with a particular law for 
example), the more useful that good becomes for everyone.32 
31 SKLANSKY, supra note 21, at 252, 257; War Games, supra note 13.  
Posner, supra note 8, argues that “regional successes”—NATO, the EU 
or NAFTA, for example—“are based either on the small number of 
parties or the dominance of a few large parties.”  Similarly, “the 
dominance” of the major players helps explain poker outcomes, but an 
oligopolistic interdependence among them does not consistently generate 
the degree of consensus seen in Posner’s “successes.” 
32 SCHERER, supra note 21, at 135, 166, 443; Snidal, supra note 19, at 
122-23; The Concrete Savannah, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 2005, 
Christmas Survey 9, at 10; The Economics of Sharing, THE ECONOMIST,
Feb. 5, 2004, 72.  See KOCH, supra note 21, at 328 (in the course of play, 
oligopolists “outline spheres of interest” which change over time); 
ROGER MILLER, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS, (discussing George 
Stigler’s implicit collusion among oligopolists, because explicit collusion 
is too costly); id. at 352 (price wars as evidence of temporary disruption 
of communication channels among oligopolists); JEFF PERLOFF AND 
KLASS VANT VELD, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 175, 229n., 
816-17 (2d ed. 1994); SCHERER at 443 (recognition among oligopolists 
that aggressive actions provoke aggressive reactions, which leads to 
mutual restraint); Snidal, supra note 28, at 133 (need for cooperation and 
coordination through bargaining internationally); Concrete Savannah, at 
11 (“humans are hard-wired not for logic but for detecting injustice.”). 
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While often-inconsistent or –incoherent rules emerge as a 
side-effect of ordinary poker, a relatively integrated body of 
international law can be built up through the group cooperation of 
‘advanced poker’ over time.  This is something no major player 
can do by itself—through its domestic rules, for example.  
Multinational corporations, and other nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) like Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and 
al-Qaeda, (the Vikings of our time, alas), also play ‘advanced 
poker’ at its fringes, strengthening global cooperation for their own 
purposes.  Even though processes may have a goal-orientation, 
rounds (or hands) are usually played in cautious and incremental 
ways.  Effects are occasionally broad and deep over time, but 
particular outcomes are more frequently halting and display some 
or much backsliding by some or many players.  Planning or 
preventative action is usually impossible; you must play the cards 
dealt you (in our analogy and in reality) under a short time horizon.  
Cooperation is never perfect: mistakes happen; rebelliousness 
occurs, especially among states taken for granted because of their 
long record of cooperation; and major and minor States sometimes 
prefer national interests (centrifugal aspirations) over a liberal 
internationalist consensus.33 
33 SCHERER, supra note 21, at 166; MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING 
ABOUT WAR, 167, 170-81 (2004); Niall Ferguson, A World Without 
Power, FOREIGN POLICY July/Aug. 2004, 23, at 38 (the “Vikings” 
allusion); Walter Mead, Sticky Power, FOREIGN POLICY Mar./Apr. 2004, 
46, at 51; Shawn Turnbull, Evergence of a Global Brain: For and From 
World Governance (2005) (read off SSRN.com as no. 637401).  See 
JACKSON, supra note 2, at 33 (discussing the tendency to overlook 
GATT obligations, especially when these are owed to the poor and 
powerless); id. at 42 (perfection can’t be expected among players with 
diverse interests); id. at 156 (the tactic of erecting barriers which cost 
your opponents more than they do you); KOCH, supra note 108, at 350 
(information about future states of the market isn’t free, and therefore 
neither are decisions about what to do so that most simply follow the 
behavior of the major players); Amman Says US Should Support 
Millennium Development Goals, REUTERS, Sept. 5, 2004, 2136 GMT 
(read off <alertnet.com>) (asked about U.S. Ambassador Bolton, Amman 
stressed “give and take” or “in the end you can’t be effective”; 
“consensus at all costs” creates “191 vetoes.”). 
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A country can be called a “rogue” if it refuses to follow this 
liberal internationalism consensus, over major issues and for 
extended periods of time.  If a rogue is relatively poor and 
powerless, it is simply ignored: Zimbabwe for example—with 
disastrous human rights consequences there.  A more powerful 
rogue gets disciplined by the majors if they can reach consensus 
over how to do this: for example, a proto-nuclear Iran or a 
chronically rights-abusing oil state like Sudan.  Almost always, a 
relatively poor and powerless state is best advised to play a 
different game or by slightly different means to create a “niche” 
for itself (clever advertising or a slightly different product are 
examples drawn from the economics of oligopoly), which will be 
tolerated by the major players because it does not disrupt their 
overall games.34 Singapore, for example, has become much richer 
and somewhat more powerful in quite specialized ways.  Yet 
Singapore is tolerated by the majors because, as a city-state, it 
lacks the capacity to become a major player—a capacity possessed 
by the India, Brazil, Indonesia, and even the Argentina and South 
Africa that are thus watched carefully by the incumbent majors. 
 The game totters along, minor rogues notwithstanding, but 
its continuance is threatened—as are the disasters that liberal 
internationalism rules are designed to avoid—when a major player 
becomes a rogue.  After all, the last bout of globalization ended 
when unresolved political tensions among the then-majors and 
their satraps exploded into World War I.  Even sophisticated 
subsystems may be unable to block the causes of their own 
destruction.  The (Younger) Bush Administration arguably turned 
the U.S. into a major-player rogue, by refusing to make important 
game moves under liberal internationalism rules35 and thus 
 
34 KOCH, supra note 21, at 350; SCHERER, supra note 21, at 10, 209; 
Sebastian Mallaby, Making Globalization Work, WASHINGTON POST,
Feb. 28, 2004, A17.  See SCHERER, at 209 (in an oligopolistic market, 
limited deviations operate to inhibit retaliation). 
35 E.g., the U.N. supported the U.S. in the Korean War, Iraqi War I 
(1991), the re-installation of Aristide in Haiti (1994) and helped the U.S. 
settle the Suez Crisis (1956) and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962.  Steven 
Schlesinger, The U.N. Under Siege, Mar. 17, 2005 (Maximnews.com). 
Bush the Younger thus came as a shock to foreign leaders familiar with 
Bush the Elder’s and Clinton’s (admittedly rather tepid) liberal 
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internationalism.  Already in 2002, a career diplomat resigning over the 
Younger’s foreign policies, John Brady Giesing, ably summarized the 
changes taking place: “We are straining beyond its limits an international 
system we built with such toil and treasure, a web of laws, treaties, 
organizations, and shared values that sets limits to our foes far more 
effectively than it ever constrained America’s ability to defend its 
interests.”  Paul Brietzke, September 11 and American Law 
(forthcoming) [hereinafter September 11] (quoting Geising).  In rapid 
succession, the current Bush Administration repudiated the Kyoto Global 
Warming Treaty, the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and U.S. participation in 
the International Criminal Court; coercive ‘agreements’ were 
subsequently wrung from a number of minor players, to keep U.S. 
citizens out of this Court.  The U.S. even managed to lose its perennial 
seat on the U.N. Human Rights Commission, and the invasive U.S.A. 
PATRIOT Act gave the U.S. a bad name among human rights advocates 
because, e.g., it encouraged rights abusers.  Common “anti-terrorism” 
cause was made with dictators in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and 
more reliable allies in “old” Europe were ignored.  Zbigniew Brzezinski 
attributes such strange policies to a blind fear that periodically verges on 
panic.  Wright, infra note 102 (quoting Brzezinski).  See AMY CHUA,
WORLD ON FIRE 8-9 (2003); Paul Brietzke, September 11; Ellen 
Goodman, A Post-Bush Mind Set, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 30, 2004, 
A19. 
 Having re-invented the doctrine of pre-emption as a kind of 
anticipatory retaliation, Bush marketed Iraqi War II as if it were a soft 
drink or toothpaste, adopting “Orwellian flourishes:” “in order to be 
relevant,” the U.N. Security Council (that was awaiting reports on 
weapons of mass destruction that turned out to not be in Iraq) “must 
become irrelevant” by allowing “the U.S. to evaluate … risk and respond 
in its sole discretion.”  Michael Kinsley, By Whose Authority, 
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 21, 2003, A37.  See Guehenno, at 90; Lazare, 
supra note 20-1, at 36. 
 Bush added fuel to foreigners’ fires over detention and torture at 
Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib.  Bush shocked even his cynical critics by 
appointing (without Senate consent) the abrasive John Bolton as U.N. 
Ambassador because, apparently, Secretary of State Rice did not want 
him as her Deputy.  Bolton is a darling of the neoconservatives who 
would dissolve the U.N. or, at the least, force Kofi Annan’s resignation, 
and whose influence over foreign policy is an increasingly permanent 
factor in the U.S.  Bolton led the U.S. repudiation of several treaties, 
alienated North Korea (an easy thing to do, perhaps) and opposes EU 
efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions.  He calls the U.N. a “rusting 
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distorting the goal-orientation of governance without a 
government.  The U.S. uses radically offensive game-moves 
(supra): Bush feels unable to wait until the next terrorist attack, for 
example, so he is trying to change international law and politics 
(ultimately the “game rules”) to enhance U.S. national security.  
But Bush now tries to reach out to a world dismayed by the foreign 
policy choices of his first term: in a conciliatory, more multilateral, 
speech to the September 2005 U.N. World Summit, for example.   
An inability to understand this global dismay is typified by 
William Smullen: “It is clear that the American brand has been 
badly damaged.  {As if I’m selling toothpaste,} I’m not suggesting 
we have to change our policy.”36 Earlier, the Security Council’s 
“no” on supporting his Iraqi War II was a moment of defiance, 
relevance, and global significance that soon collapsed nonetheless, 
 
hulk”, opposes its peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, and denies 
that the U.S. has a legal obligation to pay U.N. dues.  Bush nominated 
another neoconservative icon, Paul Wolfowitz, as the new World Bank 
President.  Diplomat and a senior Defense Department official, 
Wolfowitz is a major architect of Iraqi War II.  Glenn Kessler & Colum 
Lynch, Critic of U.N. Named Envoy, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 8, 2005, 
A1; Charles Lane, Mexicans on Death Row Get Hearings,  WASHINGTON 
POST, Mar. 8, 2005, A2; Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, 
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 10, 2005, A1; Colum Lynch, U.S. Drops 
Abortion Issue at U.N. Conference, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 5, 2005, 
A13; Brian McNamara, Letter to the Editor, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 
13, 2005, B6 (by a retired U.S. consular official); Susan Rice, Tough 
Love or Tough Luck, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 8, 2005, A15; Ian 
Williams, Real U.N. Reform, THE NATION, Dec. 27, 2004, 6; The View 
From Abroad, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 19, 2005, 24 (a Special Report on 
Anti-Americanism).  But see Condi’s Challenge (“there are signs that the 
administration is beginning to count the costs of its first-term policy.”).  
Neoconservatives see Europeans as “a bunch of duplicitous, atheistic 
wimps, whose moral laxity is leading them to an inevitable and richly 
deserved doom.”  The European Dreamers, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 
2004, 78.  In sum, the Bush Administration continues to fuel nationalist 
claims hostile to U.S. interests, and repudiates or ignores key 
international law principles.  But with some justification, 
neoconservatives take credit for democracy in the Middle East.  
36 Glenn Kessler & Robin Wright, Report: U.S. Image in Bad Shape—
Hughes Set to Begin Public Diplomacy, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 24, 
2005, A16.  
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under concentrated U.S. pressure.  In sum, Bush’s bungling comes 
close to Nixon’s 35 year-old nightmare, of turning the U.S. into a 
“pitiful, helpless giant”—unable to subdue a rag-tag Iraqi 
insurgency which has no major external sources of support.37 
Intellectually-bankrupt tactics seem to involve driving lightly-
armored U.S. vehicles down Iraqi roads—to see who shoots or has 
planted explosives. 
 
37 Anatol Lieven, Liberal Hawk Down, THE NATION, Oct. 25, 2004, 29, 
at 34.  See European Dreamers, supra note 35 (the younger Bush 
Administration is globally seen as having “feet of mud”, literally in New 
Orleans and figuratively in the Iraqi quagmire);  id. (quoting former 
British Minister Clare Shore) (U.N. reforms are difficult when “the 
world’s hegemonic power has set aside international law and declared 
that it will act unilaterally whenever its interests are suited.”); Thalif 
Deen, Despite Strictures, U.N. Chief Refuses to Yield, I.P.S., Sept. 14, 
2005, 1511 GMT (all InterPress Service News Agency, IPS, dispatches 
are read off <ips.com>); David Ignatius, They’re Not Going to Like Us, 
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 23, 2005, A23 (wanting to be loved, 
Americans assume our deep unpopularity is a “communications 
problem” to be treated by e.g., appointing Karen Hughes or perhaps 
sending more troops to Iraq); Glenn Kessler, This Year, Bush Takes a 
Different Tone With the U.N., WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 15, 2005, A08; 
U.N. Set Out to Institute Bold Reforms but Ended Up With Feeble 
Tweaks, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 15, 2005, 8:07 PM (read off 
<houstonchronicle.com>) (Bush’s conciliatory Sept. 2005 speech 
contrasted sharply with his statement three years earlier, that the U.S. 
would wage war in Iraq whether or not the Security Council approved). 
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Putin’s Russia similarly tends toward a rogue state.38 His 
purported emulation of Bush’s “democracy” and “rule of law” are 
now muted by a desire to squeeze out any political opposition, to 
claw back powers Yeltsin devolved to the regions, and to control 
the media more tightly.  The Economist sees traces of a Leninism 
in this: “Russian foreign policy is still warped by the phantom pain 
of its lost empire.  The government still has too little regard for 
private property, too often shows a reflexive distrust of business 
{having repeatedly snubbed lax IMF and World Bank policies 
concerning Russia}, and has an inflated idea of the state’s proper 
role in the economy—as recent developments in Russia’s energy 
sector demonstrate….”39 
38 Outsiders understand little about Russia: e.g., having exaggerated the 
extent to which Yeltsin established liberal democracy, they exaggerate 
the extent of Putin’s backpeddling towards authoritarianism.  
Admittedly, he has fought a brutal, human-rights-abusing war against 
nationalists in Chechniya (a separatist province), justifying this as a 
move against “terrorism”—the same justification Bush uses in Iraq.  
Russia’s political meddling in Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Abkashia (a 
province in Georgia), and Trans-Dniester (a separatist region of 
Moldova) will almost certainly continue.  But the ex-Soviet Muslim “-
stans” are slowly drifting out of the Russian orbit while adopting a 
variety of anti-democratic practices, the Baltic countries are already in 
NATO, and the Transcaucasian region is unstable and bloody—because 
local rulers pursue ethnic nationalism claims.  Rachel Denber, Beyond  
Ukraine, THE INT. HERALD TRIB., Dec. 28, 2004 (reprinted at 
<hrw.org/English/docs/2004.12/29/uzbeki
9941.htm>); Jackson Diehl, Russia’s Unchecked Ambitions, 
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 8, 2004, A21; Peter Finn, Krygystan 
Opposition Routed at Polls, Process Faulted, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 
15, 2005, A`7; Charles Krauthammer, Why Only in Ukraine?,  
WASHINGTON PO ST, Dec. 3, 2004, A27; Michael McFaul, Reform and 
Retreat, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 6, 2005, BW8; Bleak House, THE 
ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 2005, 80; An Empire’s Fraying Edge, THE 
ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2005, 21; Vladimir III, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 
2004, 46. 
39 Bury Lenin, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 2005, 12.  See note 96, infra;
Jim Hoagland, Can Russia Stem This Tide?, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 
13, 2005, A23; Andrew Osborn & Anne Penketh, Putin Boasts of 
Russian Power at E.U. Summit, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 5, 2005 (all 
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Many E.U. and U.N. officials are appalled by U.S. and 
Russian behavior, and a few commentators see Ukraine as the kick 
off in a new Cold War.40 Many minor players are seeking cover 
because they fear the onset of disasters and reallocations of power 
that the disruptions in an ‘advanced poker’ game make more 
likely.  Such disruptions in a governance without government 
game are also disruptions in relatively settled political and 
economic expectations.  Self-fulfilling prophecies of a lack of 
cooperation can lead to a potentially dangerous level of instability, 
and to even greater uncertainty and complexity.  But the poker 
games have been running within consensus borders since the end 
 
INDEPENDENT articles read online at <Independent.com>); Beyond 
Siberia, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2005, 45. 
40 Outsiders understand little about Russia: e.g., having exaggerated the 
extent to which Yeltsin established liberal democracy, they exaggerate 
the extent of Putin’s backpeddling towards authoritarianism.  
Admittedly, he has fought a brutal, human-rights-abusing war against 
nationalists in Chechniya (a separatist province), justifying this as a 
move against “terrorism”—the same justification Bush uses in Iraq.  
Russia’s political meddling in Belorus, Georgia, Moldova, Abkashia (a 
province in Georgia), and Trans-Dniester (a separatist region of 
Moldova) will almost certainly continue.  But the ex-Soviet Muslim “-
stans” are slowly drifting out of the Russian orbit while adopting a 
variety of anti-democratic practices, the Baltic countries are already in 
NATO, and the Transcaucasian region is unstable and bloody—because 
local rulers pursue ethnic nationalism claims.  Russia represses a militant 
Islam in the Caucasus in coherent ways which alienate a hitherto 
supportive population; Sharia is seen as a superior alternative to Russian 
lawlessness.  Rachel Denber, Beyond  Ukraine, THE INT. HERALD TRIB., 
Dec. 28, 2004 (reprinted at 
<hrw.org/English/docs/2004.12/29/uzbeki9941.htm>); Jackson Diehl, 
Russia’s Unchecked Ambitions, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 8, 2004, A21; 
Peter Finn, Krygystan Opposition Routed at Polls, Process Faulted, 
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 15, 2005, A`7; Charles Krauthammer, Why 
Only in Ukraine?,  WASHINGTON PO ST, Dec. 3, 2004, A27; Michael 
McFaul, Reform and Retreat, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 6, 2005, BW8;  
Kim Murphy, Rebellion Creeping Through Caucasus, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
23, 2005; Bleak House, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 2005, 80; An Empire’s 
Fraying Edge, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2005, 21; Vladimir III, THE 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 2004, 46.   
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of World War II, and most nation-states have developed buffers 
against threatened international instabilities.  These buffers may 
prove effective for a long enough period—until Bush and perhaps 
Putin leave office, for example. 
 The Chinese seem faintly bemused by Bush’s and Putin’s 
carryings-on, while positioning themselves to take advantage of 
any future chaos.  China is increasingly projecting itself as a global 
power, spending a great deal on a leaner, meaner, more 
technologically-adept military.  For example, a Chinese-Russian 
joint military exercise, Peace 2005, was a classical battle set-piece, 
with Russia using the modern equipment China lacks—perhaps to 
awe the Chinese and to make U.S. dominance in the region seem 
even more tenuous.  A very good poker player, China cozies up to 
(an anxious) Russia and Central Asian states; the U.S. schmoozes 
India and tries to persuade Japan to become more assertive towards 
China and Russia.  Its insatiable quest for oil and gas has China 
competing with India and dealing with countries blacklisted by the 
U.S. as troublesome: Myanmar, Sudan, and Iran for example.  
Persistent U.S. complaints about Chinese human rights violations, 
about inadequate protections of intellectual property, and about 
overvaluing its currency (yuan) to boost exports (using much of the 
proceeds to, it should be noted, buy the U.S. Treasury liabilities 
that finance huge U.S. deficits) have been met only with lukewarm 
‘cosmetic’ Chinese responses.  Notwithstanding China’s 
continuing economic boom, some commentators see China’s 
“socialist” (or “planned”— although its 11th Five-Year Plan is 
called a “blueprint”) market economy as the ultimate contradiction 
in terms.  A consumer choice without political choice is believed to 
spawn corruption, cronyism, and a growth in the number and scale 
of public protests.  In any event, this “harmonious society” (the 
new buzzword in China) is under threat from a galloping inequality 
in the distribution of wealth.41 
41 Antoneta Bezlova, Great Leap to Help Rural China, I.P.S., Oct. 14, 
2005, 0417 GMT; Paul Blustein, U.S. Urges IMF Crackdown on 
{Chinese} Currency, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 24, 2005, D1; Dieter 
Farwick, China is Flexing Its Military Might, WORLD SECURITY NET 
NEWSLETTER, Sept. 21, 2005 (read of 
<newsletter@worldsecuritynetwork.com>); Niall Ferguson, The Man-
Eater of Asia’s Tigers, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005; The Cauldron Boils, 
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The E.U. attempts to achieve a common foreign policy and 
international law reform policy, with (only) a modest degree of 
success. THE ECONOMIST goes too far in playing down the E.U.’s 
role in international relations and law by likening it to the role of a 
Greek chorus (rather than a disorganized cacophony): commenting, 
reacting with horror or praise, but playing no part in the action.42 
Bush is seen as this play’s tragic protagonist, “hurrying to his 
 
THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 2005, 38; The Dragon Comes Calling, THE 
ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2005, 24.  Peter Goodwin, China’s Transformation, 
WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 4, 2005, 10 AM (China’s economy will 
stumble at some point given “rickety” banking, water and energy 
shortages, social instability, the wastage of capital and “white 
elephants”); see note 137 infra (in a statement presumably calculated by 
Government, a Chinese General threatened to “nuke” hundreds of U.S. 
cities, if the U.S. intervened over Taiwan); id. (a 1998 Chinese Army 
publication recognizes the impressibility of challenging the U.S. on its 
own terms, so the solution is to subvert banks, stock markets, and 
defense contractors; flood the U.S. with drugs; seize natural resources 
overseas; paralyze U.S. phones, media, and traffic; and use psychological 
warfare); id. (China’s regular “deliberate ambiguity” is something the 
Pentagon is not set up to address); Bezlova (the Chinese Public Security 
Ministry admitted 74,000 “serious” protests in 2004, involving 3.7 
million people—up from 50,000 protests in 2003); id. (in 2005, to Oct., 
23 policemen were killed during “riots” and 1,826 injured); Edward 
Cody, China Will Pursue Reforms and Focus on Poverty, WASHINGTON 
POST, Oct. 11, 2005 (with no reference to growing protests, a 
communiqué stated—“We have to solve the contradictions of the 
people”, “their most crucial, direct and unrealistic problems”); id. (no 
countervailing power such as an independent court system will be 
tolerated, and “the most important thing is to strengthen the ability and 
liberty of the party.”); Shasha Trudeau, The Red China of Two Naïve 
Guys, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 16, 2005, 8:19 AM (all STAR articles are 
read off <thestar.com>) (quoting Shao Ming) “China used to be only one 
color—red,” but not it “is many colours”); The Dragon, at 25 (Chinese 
leader Hu will ask Bush to treat China as a “market economy” —thus 
making the application of U.S> anti-dumping measures more difficult—
but the request is unlikely to be granted). 
42 Europe’s Cassandra Complex, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2005, 54 
(citing Bob Kagan).  Like the E.U., a Greek chorus often supports the 
“law”—as in Sophocles’s Antigone, id. 
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doom and reckless of the consequences of his actions.”43 Some 
neoconservative Americans return the favor, seeing E.U. members 
as too disorganized, “cowardly, cynical and decadent to support 
America’s courageous and idealistic mission….”44 Admittedly, 
France is often prickly and seeks to dominate consensus, Blair’s 
Britain is often the outsider of Europe—trying to play poker like 
Bush, Europe’s ideological wounds are slow to heal, and the 
failure of the new E.U. Constitution in two referenda exposes a 
legitimation crisis within Europe.  In addition to hiving off Britain, 
Bush managed to divide the E.U. further over Iraq: Italy, Poland 
and (temporarily) Spain came over to Bush’s “coalition of the 
willing.”  Despite such disunity on some issues, the E.U. was one 
of the few parties that backed the World Summit draft document as 
a whole.  In comparison, the U.S. proposed 700 amendments to 
this draft, while Russia, Cuba, Pakistan, Algeria, Iran and others 
also sought extensive changes.45 
43 Id. 
44 Lieven, supra note 37, at 34. 
45 See note ___ infra (emphasis supplied).  See Stefania Bianchi, Amid 
Budget Spat, E.U. Searches for the Big Picture, I.P.S., Oct. 28, 2005, 
0035 GMT; id. (quoting Alasdair Murray) (all EU countries face similar 
challenges to their social models—aging populations, low-wage 
competition from Asia and high unemployment in some areas); id. (we 
must reach a policy consensus before attempting other reforms); Stefania 
Bianchi, U.N. Summit Being Written Off Already, I.P.S., Sept. 21, 2005, 
0323 GMT (Luis Morago, head of Oxform, Brussels urges European 
leaders to go further on poverty reduction and arms control); Stephen 
Castle, China Says Brussels Does Not Care About Job Losses in Assault 
on Economic Policy, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 7, 2005, 18:15 (Chirac 
stresses the need for an E.U. united front on globalization in “classic 
Chirac: defining Europe and France as the same thing.”); Romulo, supra 
note 16; Annan Says, supra note 25; To Doha’s Rescue, THE 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 2005, 13 (Peter Mandelson, the European 
commissioner for trade, “needs approval from national governments if he 
is to go as far as his American counterpart”); Similarly the negotiating 
points of the U.S. must be confirmed by congressional enactment. 
 On the EU as a major player, see Morton Abrahamowitz and Heather 
Hurlbut, Where to Start With Europe, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 9, 2005, 
BW5 (reviewing TIMOTHY GORTON ASH, AMERICA, EUROPE, AND THE 
SURPRISING FUTURE OF THE WEST, and T.R. REID, THE UNITED STATES 
OF EUROPE) (the residual affectation, resilient interdependence, and 
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The European Commission calls the U.N.’s Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs, infra) “the core” of E.U. development 
policy, the “new … consensus” of “a global player.”46 A
nongovernmental organization (NGO) official notes that the E.U. 
claims “moral leadership over MDGs”, in what we might call an 
important “bet” in a major poker game, but E.U. countries must 
“deliver on their promises” through collective action—to be 
“credible.”47 Arguably, E.U. performance during the Doha Round 
of WTO negotiations (infra) saps its credibility. 
 A Deputy Secretary-General who recently resigned, the 
Canadian Louise Frechette, calls the U.N. the complex center of 
just about everything since the end of the Cold War, of high 
ambitions and often higher expectations.  Outcomes have been 
both “notable successes and [the] shattering failures” that rarely 
stem from the U.N. simply walking away from a problem.48 As 
adaptable, evolving reflections of the world, the members of the 
U.N. “family” (which includes international conferences even) 
have an international legal personality (without approximating the 
organs of a world government), can participate in international 
relations independent of their member nation-states, and can create 
 
furious passion of the trans-Atlantic relationship); id. (the Europeans’ 
“bickering and boredom: and anxiety over “feeling dwarfed by the U.S. 
hyperpuissance.”) id. (Ash shows how disunity is “one of the things we 
in the West have in common.”); id. (Ash shows how “building a future in 
defiance of the other—the Soviet Union in the past, America today, 
perhaps in Islam or China tomorrow—is neither sustainable nor 
ennobling.”); Editorial: Backward in China, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 
20, 2004, A22. 
46 #72 [????] [emphasis supplied). 
47 Olivia Ward, Frechette’s U.N. Challenge, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 24, 
2005, 8:13 A.M.  See notes __ and accompanying text (E.U.’s behavior 
over the Doha Round of WTO negotiations). 
48 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES,
Introduction, xxv, xxxv (2005); Brietzke, supra note 7; Tony Evans, 
International Human Rights as Power/Knowledge, 27 H. RT. Q. 1046, 
1054-56 (2005); See notes 5, 17, 26, 51 (quoting Annan).  But see note 
26, supra: in a 2003 Poll, the U.N.’s “standing” declined in the 20 
countries polled, in the U.S. because the U.N. didn’t sanction Iraqi War 
II and in the 19 others because it couldn’t prevent it. 
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an independent customary international law.  But like the E.U., the 
U.N. is a major player only when adequate power and resources 
are delegated by members, after the requisite consensus is 
mustered.  Then, the U.N. can build its own distinctive power: the 
ability to legitimate or delegitimate political, social, economic, and 
even military actions.  Lawyers as lawyers like poker games 
organized around this legitimation rubric because, among other 
things, rules of international law are often created during the 
course of play.  Some argue that such games serve to conceal 
processes of domination, however—including those ostensibly 
operating through “markets”, another game rubric thought 
legitimate by the U.S., increasingly by China, and tolerated by 
many developing countries as a necessary evil under strictures 
imposed by the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank, etc.49 
A major function of the U.N. is the collective 
empowerment of the relatively powerless (i.e., the U.N. sometimes 
plays poker hands as a major acting on behalf of minor players), by 
offering a forum where minors’ concerns and arguments can be 
aired, and a solution to some collective action problems.  This can 
be seen in a U.N. representation of the sometimes-diffuse interests 
of the 118-member Non-Aligned Movement, more powerful 
during the Cold War and currently led by Malaysia, India, and 
South Africa.  This Movement is frequently ignored by widely-
circulated media, as is an even less well-known Group of 77 (with 
134 members) currently chaired by Jamaica and the Group of 24, 
formed in 1971 to unify developing countries’ positions on 
monetary policy and development finance.  At the other end of the 
player spectrum, Bush’s neoconservative surrogates (Norm 
Coleman, Tom DeLay, and Henry Hyde, for example) created an 
existential crisis when they picked up Bush’s cudgels for use 
against another lame duck, Secretary-General Annan, over what 
 
49 5; Commentary: United Nations to the Rescue (of Itself), CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 15, 2005 (U.N. “power lies in getting norms of 
behavior and then using a major voice to persuade or shame norm-
breakers to follow suit.”); and infra notes 106 and 107.  Ronald 
Saunders, Small States Need a Stronger U.N., CARIBBEAN NET NEWS,
Sept. 27, 2005; Martin Walker, Bush v. Annan: Taming the United 
States, 22 (5) WORLD POL’Y J. (Spring 2005) (read off 
<worldpolicy.com>). 
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amounts to an oil-for-food corruption sidebar (infra) to the World 
Summit.  This crisis set two of the world’s most impressive “spin 
machines” into motion, and the forces of liberal internationalism 
prevailed over the neocons: China, Russia, 105 other states and the 
E.U., plus the NEW YORK TIMES, WASHINGTON POST, National 
Public Radio, and the BBC supported the “bold reformer” Annan 
as the best Secretary General since Dag Hammarskjold.  (Some see 
this as rather faint praise.)50 
Like fairies, paper money or perhaps the Soviet Union, the 
U.N. would cease to exist (at least as a major player) if people 
stopped believing in it.  This seems the tactic attempted by U.S. 
neoconservatives, along with curbing funding for the U.N., but it is 
wildly unrealistic.  The U.N. currently oversees 18 peacekeeping 
operations, using 8,000 troops.  Would the U.S. want to pay for 
and pacify these problematic hot spots by itself?51 Rather, 
shouldn’t the U.S. want to reform U.N. institutions so as to 
strengthen them for this purpose, out of a national self-interest—so 
that the U.S. can concentrate on playing poker games with greater 
pay-offs?  But this was not to be.  Accurately forecasting the 
outcome from the September 2005 World Summit, Samantha 
Powers notes that the “U.N.’s imperfections were manifest from its 
creation,” as “built upon … obvious contradictions ….  Whatever 
they can agree upon {at the Summit} is sure to be disappointing 
and will be derided.”52 
SUMMITRY 
50 Simon Chesterman, Duty Pulls Annan in Two Directions, INT.
HERALD TRIB., Sept. 9, 2005; Thalif Deen, Post-Summit Dilemma of 
Promises and Delivery, I.P.S., Sept. 27, 2005; Sebastian Mallaby, Bush’s 
Missed U.N. Opportunity, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 12, 2005, A19; 
Schlesinger, supra note 35.  See Ward, Frechette, supra note 47 (the 
U.N. is looked upon as a necessary, and often most competent partner—
for players major and minor); notes ___ and accompanying text, infra 
(corruption sidebar). 
51 See Samantha Power, To Save the World From Hell, LE MONDE 
DIPLOMATIQUE, Sept. 2005.  See id.: 60 years ago, Henry Cabot Lodge, 
Jr. said that the U.N. won’t “bring us to heaven”, but it might “save us 
from hell.” 
52 Id. 
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For the U.N., “success never seems to resonate as much as 
failure”: disasters in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia53; the U.S. 
circumventing collective (Security Council) action over Iraqi War 
II; sexual abuse by U.N. troops in the Congo and elsewhere; and 
corruption in the oil-for-food program (sidebar, infra).  The U.N. 
might be thought ineffective because we still face war, injustice, 
and poverty, yet we avoided World War III (so far, in no small 
measure because of the international law rules governing the 
parties’ poker games), and more people now live in countries 
where freedoms are protected to some extent by law.  The U.N. has 
run elections in 90 countries and peacekeeping operations in 60, 
helped resolve 170 regional conflicts, and assisted in the 
decolonization of 80 countries.  Such activities are the primary 
cause for a 40% decline in armed conflicts since the end of the 
Cold War.  The U.N. imposes sanctions on member-miscreants, 
and sets up international criminal tribunals and then convinces 
members to turn over potential defendants.  The High Commission 
for Refugees aided 50 million refugees from war, famine or 
persecution; the International Atomic Energy Agency (winner of 
the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize) searches for W.M.D. and created 
security measures for 100 nuclear facilities in 70 countries; and the 
World Health Organization wiped out smallpox and markedly 
reduced polio.54 
53 Editorial: Short-Lived Celebration, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005. 
 
54 Chesterman, supra note 50; Kathryn Horvat & Pat Shea, The U.N.: 
60 Years and Still Counting, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 22, 2005 (read off 
<sltrib.com>); Edith Lederer, Global Violence Has Decreased, U.N. 
Says, WASHINGTON POST/ASSOC. P., Oct. 18, 2005, 9:12 A.M.; Shashi 
Tharoor, In Order to Redeem, the United Nations Must Be Redeemed, 
THE (Lebanon) DAILY STAR Sept. 15, 2005; Editorial: U.N. is Faced 
With New Challenges, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Oct. 24, 2005; U.N. Set, 
supra note 37.  But see Michael Glennon, Idealism That Won’t Work 
(2005) (S.S.R.N. Pap. No. ___) (medicrease in violence “might have 
been the result of … growing economic integration, stronger alliances, 
military deterrence, more influential N.G.O.s, the reportage of the mass 
media, or merely a transnational sense of horror over the barbarism of 
war.”); Juan Somovia, The Humanitarian Responsibilities of the U.N. 
Security Council (1996) (downloaded from <globalpolicy.com>) 
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Past reform efforts were spurred by the vision and political 
will of the leaders of particular nation-states, often after a war.  
The current round of reform turns this process on its head, by 
trying to create political will internally—to make the U.N. more 
effective.  The fear is that “under performing” U.N. institutions—
some see a U.N. system failure, a series of market (-like) failures in 
the provision of public goods like peace and development—will 
otherwise be unable to meet new threats and opportunities.55 In 
preparation, Secretary-General Annan named a Panel of High-
Level Experts, to report on issues of peace and security56, while 
economists led by Jeffrey Sachs considered how the commitments 
made at the 2000 Millennium Summit could best be 
implemented.57 In March 2005, Annan synthesized their key 
recommendations in his manifesto, In Larger Freedom.58 The 
Secretary General deliberately set an ambitious and tightly-
packaged agenda, given the watering-down and fragmentation that 
inevitably results from negotiations (poker games played) over this 
agenda.  Pakistan, which merits some of the blame for eventual 
reform failures, feared that so ‘heavy’ an agenda would lead to 
collapse, leaving the Summit with no tangible result.59 (This didn’t 
happen, of course: poker and especially ‘advanced poker’ rules are 
designed to avoid collapse/no-result at almost any cost.) 
 Many echo Annan over an essential interrelatedness of the 
development, security (including the suppression of terrorism), and 
 
(“sanctions as currently-practiced produce large-scale human insecurity, 
the opposite of their intended effect.”).  
55 Kofi Annan, Secretary-General Urges Reform Process Forward, 
Speech to the World Summit, Sept. 15, 2005, SG/SM/10090/Rev.1*, 
GA/10380/Rev.1.
56 See Jean-Maria Guehenno, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 
2005) (the U.N. under Secretary for Peacekeeping) (the U.N. 
investigated 221 peacekeepers over sexual abuse in the Congo, 
repatriated 88 soldiers … so some of whom are being prosecuted in their 
home country … fired 10 civilians).  Tharoor, supra note 54. 
57 JEFFREY SACHS, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL PLAN 
TO ACHIEVE THE MILLENNIUM (2004). 
58 <un.org/largerfreedom> (UNDP). 
59 Brown, supra note 15; Colum Lynch & Glenn Keasler, U.N. Scales 
Back Plan of Action, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 14, 2005, A6; 
Schlesinger, supra note 35; David Usborne #61. 
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respect for human rights, all to be achieved through U.N. reforms.  
But the U.S., Russia to a lesser extent, and a relatively few minor 
players persisted in pulling at any snag or frayed edge that 
emerged when Annan’s proposals were put under negotiating 
stress.  In effect, these players chose to play many separate poker 
games—not of the ‘advanced’ variety—for narrow, short-term, and 
sometimes-misperceived gains.  A U.N. culture of inaction absent 
consensus enabled these players to shape non-reform outcomes, as 
the economists’ “holdouts” —veto groups whose existence is made 
possible by the extraordinarily high “transaction costs” of U.N. 
reform.  Annan’s hope for an idealized, grand social contract (or a 
single, idealized ‘advanced poker’ game) were dashed—developed 
countries genuinely working to alleviate Third World poverty, in 
exchange for developing countries’ support for the reforms 
developed countries sought.  But Annan was careful not to 
challenge the permanent members of the Security Council—those 
with a veto or, roughly, what are called the major poker players 
here—since their power and consensus is essential to any 
successful reform. 60 Had the U.S. stood with the other majors, 
would it have been possible to isolate Russia and eliminate 
(through a broad range of coercions) the minor-player holdouts?  
The logic of poker suggests “yes.”   
 The Summit, “the 900 pound gorilla, … the largest in 
history,” occurred when about 170 nation-state leaders gathered for 
a “once-in-a-generation” opportunity for U.N. reform61, in New 
York during September 2005.  Mark Malloch Brown says that, on 
the morning the Summit opened, negotiations were “heading off 
 
60 #51; Edith M. Lederer, Leaders Fall Short on Larger Goals in Effort 
to Fight Poverty, Terrorism at U.N. Summit, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
9/17/05; Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, The Alternative U.N., LE
MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Sept. 2005.  The holdouts “spoiler countries” 
variously include the U.S., Russia, Myanmar, Turkemenistan, Belarus, 
India, Vietnam, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba, Pakistan, Egypt, and Iran.  #5; 
Nick Wadhams, General Assembly OKs Compromise Document, AP, 
Sept. 13, 2005.  The people deserve better than this disingenuous horse 
trading; there is no evidence of the political will to stop, e.g., another 
Rwanda, id.  See note ___ and text accompanying, infra (some effects of 
the holdouts). 
61 Olivia Ward, U.N. Faces the Fight of its Life, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 
12, 2005, 1:00 A.M. 
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the rails”, with 140 passages and 27 issues still left undecided.62 
Annan and the incoming and outgoing General Assembly 
Presidents took “a high-risk gamble”: deleted contentious matters 
from the draft Summit outcome, adopted alternative language they 
thought could win approval, and submitted a “clean” copy to 
members—who then adopted it quickly.63 Everyone had to 
“compromise”64, something our ‘advanced poker’ model predicts, 
as it does the narrow limitations on such compromises—composed 
as they are of diverse national interests and desires to “win.” 
 In any event, Annan’s proposals were criticized for 
ignoring the complexities of global society, and for the 
impossibility of reform where the major powers refuse to give up 
their prerogatives.  Secretary-General Annan did much to open up 
U.N. processes to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs, 
including corporations, as “stakeholders” in a civil society), 
arguably to open up and solidify ‘advanced poker’ as the dominant 
game.  But NGOs strongly objected to a lack of control over the 
Summit agenda, and the lack of access to closed-door negotiations 
among nation-states.  In contrast, the Helsinki Summit and the 
(Bill) Clinton Global Initiative, held just before and just after the 
U.N. Summit respectively, made room for NGO participation in 
the “intense dialogue” no longer possible at the U.N. “because of 
highly ritualistic structures, protocol and conflict avoidance.”65 
The “multi-stakeholder” Helsinki process will go forward under 
 
62 Edith Lederer, U.N. Summit Leaders to Adopt Weak Document, 
SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 15, 2005 (read off 
<seattlepi.com>). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Glenn Kessler, Clinton Gathers World Leaders, WASHINGTON POST,
Sept. 16, 2005, A2 (quoting Richard Holbrook, U.N. Ambassador under 
Clinton).  See Sanjay Suri, Development: NGOs Talk, Governments 
Listen, IPS, Sept. 7, 2005, 02:05 GMT; Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, 
The Alternative U.N., LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Sept. 2005; 117, supra 
note __, 134; (Clinton reportedly wanted to be Secretary General, and is 
skilled at “building bridges”); Coate, supra note 1; Maggie Farley, U.N. 
Reform Bid Exposes its Woes, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005; Sanjay Suri, 
NGOs Talk, Governments Listen, I.P.S., Sept. 6, 2005 (70 governments 
and 600 NGOs at Helsinki). 
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two NGOs, the Celso Furtado Centre in Sao Paolo, Brazil, and the 
Brookings Institution in Washington.66 
NGO officials also came up with specific criticisms of 
Summit outcomes: e.g., “We wanted a bold agenda to tackle 
poverty but instead we have a brochure showcasing past 
commitments” and omitting, e.g., women’s rights issues.67 Only 
democratic, “comprehensive, radical and transparent reform of the 
U.N. will enable this system to fulfill its historical role….”68 The 
“watered-down” language of the “cleverly-crafted” Summit 
outcome document shows the U.N. becoming “the biggest talk—
but not act—shop in the world.”69 The Mauritius Ambassador 
speaks of a “least common denominator” Summit outcome 
document70 which, according to a political science professor, will 
not move the world toward promoting human security.71 There 
was a leadership vacuum, which is what the poker analogy would 
lead us to expect.  Clare Short finds “depression and mistrust”72,
66 Sanjay Suri, Development: Straight Talk Expected at Post-Helsinki 
Roundtables, I.P.S., Sept. 14, 2005; Goday, supra note 66. [?????} 
67 Edith M. Lederer, Annan Appeals to World Leaders at Summit, 
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 14, 2005 (quoting Oxfam’s Nicola Reindorp).  
See #38; notes ___ and accompanying text, infra (MDGs).  Oxfam’s 
4,000 partner organizations in 70 countries promote dignity and 
development.  Juan Somavia, The Humanitarian Responsibilities of the 
U.N. Security Council (downloaded from <globalpolicy.org>). 
68 Elisa Marincola, Summit Ignores People’s U.N., IPS, Sept. 16, 2005 
(quoting Antonio Papisca of the University of Padua’s Centre for Human 
Rights).  See Haider Rizvi, Anger at Washington Simmers on Eve of U.N. 
Meet, IPS, Sept. 1, 2005. 
69 Thalia Deen, March Toward MDGs Leaving Millions Behind, IPS, 
Sept. 16, 2005 (quoting Saradha Iyer, of Malaysia’s Third World 
Network).  See Ward, supra note 47 (document is “heavy on rhetoric and 
light on substance.” 
70 #61 (quoting the Ambassador).  See id. (quoting Mark Malloch 
Brown): “we always knew we wouldn’t get the full loaf.  We’ve got to 
start counting slices.” 
71 Coate, supra note 1. 
72 Clare Short: Depression and Mistrust Prevail at the U.N., THE 
INDEPENDENT ONLINE, Sept. 15, 2005 (quoting former British Minister 
Short).  See Mary Robinson, A New Way of Doing the World’s Business, 
INT. HERALD TRIB., Sept. 25, 2005 (a leadership vacuum deprived the 
summit of “backbone”). 
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which we might see as attitudes making ‘advanced poker’ less 
likely.  According to Mary Robinson, the U.N. “had its bluff 
called….”73 Venezuela’s Foreign Minister objected to the “anti-
democratic” negotiation process, and especially to having to 
approve the outcome document before it was translated into 
Spanish.74 But the elliptical ECONOMIST finds the document “not 
wholly devoid of substance.”75 
American neoconservatives are even more critical: e.g., 
Brett Schaefer sees the Summit as another step on the path towards 
U.N. irrelevance, inefficiency, and more low-priority, costly 
mandates.76 John Yoo agrees with this characterization, but goes 
on to argue that the U.N. reforms will markedly increase 
transaction costs—thus reducing the U.N.’s ability to solve 
collective action problems.77 For Nicholas Kristof, the Summit 
was history’s biggest gathering of “hypocrites”, who “preen and 
boast”; along with the Italians and Japanese, “Americans set a 
dreadful example.”78 
73 Id. 
74 Edith Lederer, Leaders Fall Short of Larger Goals in Effort to Fight 
Poverty, Terrorism at the U.N. Summit, AP, Sept. 17, 2005 (read off 
<ABC.com>) (quoting Minister Rodriguez). 
75 Better Than Nothing, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2005, 33.  See 
Thalif Dean, supra note 69 (quoting Jamaica’s Foreign Minister Knight, 
speaking for the Group of 77) (the Summit outcome at best “a bag of 
mixed results”); George Mitchell, Don’t Write Off U.N. Reform Just Yet, 
INT. HERALD TRIB., Oct. 11, 2005 (document “papered over many 
differences and skirted other issues”, but it “establishes a starting point” 
and a consensus is building); Nahal Toosi, Annan Depends Summit’s 
Accomplishments, Agrees Some Results Were Nixed, A.P. NEWSDAY,
Oct. 17, 2005, 3:15 EDT (while the absence of progress on non-
proliferation a “disgrace”, administrative reforms were nixed, the 
Millennium Development Goals were “endorsed”, and the peacebuilding 
commission is a valuable creation). 
76 Brett D. Schaefer, The U.N. Summit Document: At What Cost?, THE 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Sept. 21, 2005 (quoting  the Heritage 
Foundation’s Schaefer). 
77 Yoo, supra note 8. 
78 Nicholas D. Kristof, Meet the Fakers, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 
13, 2005. 
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With some justification, much of the blame for reform 
failures is attributed to John Bolton, Bush’s recess appointment as 
U.N. Ambassador—because the (Republican-dominated) Senate 
refused to confirm him.  (Some see Bush’s appointment as the 
abandonment of a bipartisan foreign policy.)  The bull in the china 
shop who stalemated the Summit for most observers, Bolton was 
regarded by the U.S. neoconservatives as showing that the U.N. 
emperor has no clothes.  At Bolton’s request, all references to the 
International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol were deleted 
from the document.  But he was unsuccessful at deleting all 
quantitative goals relating to the Millennium Development 
Initiative.  Speaking at the Summit, Bush got to play “good cop” to 
Bolton’s “bad cop”, and the consensus was of a pleasant surprise 
over Bush’s more conciliatory “moral obligation” to go along with 
much of the outcome document.79 However, our poker analogy 
suggests that Bolton could not have had so significant an impact on 
the Summit without disruptions from the Russians and especially 
from the minor-player holdouts that, like the U.S.,  were grinding 
 
79 Haider Rizvi, Anger at Washington Simmers on Eve of U.N. Meet, 
I.P.S., Sept. 14, 2005;  Barbara Slavin, Bolton Dives Right in to Effort to 
Change U.N., USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 2005; Celia Dugger, U.N. vs. 
Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005; Maggie Farley & Warren Vieth, 
Bush, Annan Tout Role of the U.N., L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005; Better 
Than Nothing, supra note 75; U.N. Set Out, supra note 37.  See Evelyn 
Leopold, Fears Grow of Meltdown at Ambitious U.N. Summit, REUTERS,
Sept. 11, 2005 19:17:19 GMT (quoting David Schorr) (Bolton’s 
“overreaching by niggling over small stuff rather than shoring up the 
major items.”); Jonathan Beale, Strained Relations for U.S. & U.N., BBC 
News, Aug. 8, 2005, 0210 GMT (the man Bolton replaced at the U.N., 
Nicholas Burns, had worked hard and collaboratively); Klaus Brinkbaum 
& Greg Mascolo, The Gangs of New York, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Sept. 26, 
2005 (Bolton downgraded “the final document to little more than a 
meaningless sketchpad of world politics.”); Thalif Deen, U.S.-U.N. 
Relations May be on a Collision Course, I.P.S., Aug. 5, 2005 (quoting 
James Paul Bolton is like an atheist appointed as ambassador to the 
Vatican); id. (“through threats and blackmail,” the U.S. tries to bend the 
U.N. to its will—without breaking it); Appendix, infra (the MDG 
quantitative goals that remained). 
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very different axes, trying to win short-term games for their own 
purposes and in distinctive ways.   
 These reform and non-reform outcomes will be discussed 
under eight headings: the composition of, and voting arrangements 
in, the Security Council; U.N. powers of intervention and the new 
“responsibility to protect” against genocide and war crimes; 
terrorism, a central concern of the U.S. and the U.K.; a new 
Peacebuilding Commission, to help nations emerging from 
conflict; the non-proliferation of W.M.D., and of ordinary weapons 
as well; management and administration within the U.N.; human 
rights; and (non-) implementation of the Millennium Development 
Goals.  How all of this will be paid for remains to be seen, of 
course; this is a topic of little interest to players totaling up their 
wins and losses at poker.80 
The Security Council (S.C.) 
 
The S.C. will remain an unreformed “aristocratic” 
(undemocratic) yet rather “toothless” “executive” body, which 
suffers from a “credibility deficit.”81 For example, fears of a 
Chinese and/or Russian veto have so far stopped the S.C. from a 
needed and otherwise-feasible humanitarian intervention in Darfur, 
in Sudan.  Many minor players are opposed to reform of the S.C., 
as conducive to marginalizing the General Assembly (G.A.)—in 
what is assumed to be a zero-sum (poker) game between them.  
More modest (transaction cost- reducing) reforms of the G.A., the 
minor-players’ bailiwick, were approved by the Summit—
streamlining committee structures, speeding up deliberations, and 
 
80 Main Divisive Issues Before World U.N. Summit, REUTERS 
ALERTNET, Sept. 5, 2005, 0531GMT.  See Julio Godoy, ‘Summit Will 
Look for the Money’, IPS, Sept. 13, 2005 (examining proposals to raise 
global Tobin taxes on currency speculation, environmentally-hazardous 
activities, and corporate profits); note ___, supra (holdouts).  The MDGs 
are listed in the Appendix. 
81 See Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 65 (S.C. has allowed conflicts 
to proliferate and intervened arbitrarily); Deen, Despite Strictures, supra 
note 37 (the S.C. fails to define its own parameters and responsibilities 
in, e.g., the Iraq oil-for-food program, and is inherently flawed by the 
lack of democracy—the vetoes of permanent members are a recipe for 
paralysis and failure).  But see note ___ and accompanying text, infra.
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rationalizing the G.A. agenda—despite an apparent preference 
among members of the G.A. for paralyzing, protracted debates.  
Poker analyses show why “democratizing” reforms to the S.C.—
e.g., eliminating permanent membership and thus vetoes—went 
nowhere.  (Even Bush/Bolton were uncharacteristically coy about 
this reform, perhaps because they knew it was doomed to 
failure).82 
Permanent S.C. members are roughly coextensive with our 
major poker players, the E.U. getting two S.C. ‘half’-vetoes: 
Britain and/or France don’t always reflect interests of the E.U. as a 
whole.  Denied a S.C. veto, one or more major players could rather 
easily find another way to wreck any disagreeable (to them) game 
created by many or most minor players through the G.A.  The 
failure of many important G.A. (one state, one vote) resolutions 
attest to this power.  Similarly, creating additional permanent 
members, with or without a veto, is bound to fail de facto, since 
this would increase transaction costs and give middle-level players 
a (quasi-major-player) power they cannot currently win by playing 
games with the other majors.  In any event, the other members 
were unable to choose two new permanents (a step recommended 
in Annan’s In Greater Freedom) from among the lobbying 
aspirants: Japan, India, Germany, Brazil, and South Africa 
(although the African Union wanted two permanent seats from 
Africa).  Alternatively, Italy, Canada, Pakistan, Mexico, and 16 
other countries proposed ten additional temporary (rotating) S.C. 
seats: this is a feasible increase in representativeness, but it would 
come at the price of significantly higher transaction costs in the 
S.C.’s production of public goods.  In the end, no formal votes 
were taken on these reforms, and the Summit final document 
contained an anodyne “commitment” to make the S.C. “more 
broadly representative, more efficient and transparent.”83 But the 
 
82 Evelyn Leopold, Fears Grow of Meltdown at Ambitious U.N. 
Summit, REUTERS, Sept. 11, 2005, 19:17:19 GMT;  Remarks by Louise 
G. Frechette, Deputy Secretary-General, United Nations, ABA Day at 
the UN, Mar. 29, 2005; 73, Chemimllier-Gendreau, supra note 65; 
Mallaby, supra note 34; Posner, supra note 8; Darfur’s Despair, THE 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 2005, 47. 
83 Richard Black, U.N. Reforms Receive Mixed Response, BBC News, 
Sept. 17, 2005, 0730 GMT (quoting the document).  See Mark Turner, 
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debate over S.C. seats, what some describe as the Summit’s 
biggest failure—to deal with an issue which had been percolating 
for a decade, “sucked the oxygen from other issues and divided the 
member states ….”84 Thoroughgoing reforms are arguably needed, 
so that the S.C. better defends law: the rule of international law is 
widely regarded as endangered.  The S.C. must also become more 
accountable, transparent, and legitimate—e.g., to counter its image 
of “the fox guarding the chicken coop”; and it must adopt more 
permanent and effective procedures.85 
Terrorism 
 
A recent study shows “international terrorism” to be the 
only form of political violence that is on the increase.  
Political/organizational/technological innovations enable terrorist 
NGOs (whether we like this or not) to do things which were 
formerly the province of rogue nation-states, things which render a 
national self-defense almost impossible and which make terrorist 
organizations able to grab a seat at a poker table and often disrupt 
the game.  For the U.S., Britain, and perhaps some other countries, 
this justifies an oxymoronic anticipatory retaliation (infra) as a 
game-move.  The obvious risk this tactic poses to peace and 
security, when misused in Iraqi War II games for example, seems a 
prime motive behind U.N. attempts to regulate terrorism.  A 
Convention Against Nuclear Terrorism, based on Russian 
 
U.N. “Must Never Again be Found Wanting on Genocide’, FINANCIAL 
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005; 112a; Evelyn Leopold, Like Fixing the Weather, 
Council Reform Eludes U.N., REUTERS ALERTNET, Sept. 19, 2005, 0854 
GMT; Andrew Teitelbaum, All We Can Hope is That Things Don’t Get 
Worse, I.P.S., SEPT. 24, 2005, 1418 GMT; Yoo, supra note 8. 
84 Chesterman, supra note 50.  See Thalif Deen, U.N.’s Authority 
Tested by Perils Ahead, I.P.S., Dec. 27, 2005. 
85 James Paul & Celine Nahory, Theses Toward a Democratic Reform 
of the U.N. Security Council, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, July 13, 2005 
(downloaded from <globalpolicy.org>).  See Somovia, supra note 54; 
Swiss Government, Working Methods of the Security Council July 2005 
(17 recommendations in a “non paper” downloaded from 
<globalpolicy.org>). 
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proposals and criticized for omitting prohibitions on a state 
terrorism, was nevertheless approved by the G.A. and opened for 
signature by leaders at the World Summit.  It is the latest of 
thirteen anti-terrorism conventions.  Still, some think that terrorism 
is inadequately outlawed by international law, especially those 
who believe that this inadequacy licenses intervention by one or a 
few countries.  Britain’s Tony Blair thus proposed Security 
Council Resolution 1624, which passed unanimously during the 
Summit.  Under it, all members must now “prevent incitement” to 
terrorism, deny safe haven to terrorists, and (a Blair preoccupation) 
“counter violent extremist ideologies.”86 But Kumi Naidoo, an 
NGO official and former African National Congress (ANC) 
activist, argues that 1624 is of “no effect” without a definition of 
“terrorism” from the Summit G.A.87 Human Rights Watch and 
Human Rights First disagree: oppressive governments can use a 
 
86 U.N. Security Council Passes Resolutions Related to Terrorism, 
JERUSALEM POST INTERNATIONAL Sept. 14, 2005, (quoting S.C. Res. 
1624).  See Andrew Grice, Blair Frustrated as U.N. Fails to Agree on 
Anti-terror Action, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 15, 2005; Lederer, Global 
Violence, supra note 54; Haider Rizvi, U.N. Treaty Targets Rogue 
Nukes, IPS, Sept. 13, 2005; Yoo, supra note 8; Security Council Meeting 
at Summit Level Unanimously Adopts Anti-Terror Steps, Sept. 14, 2005 
(downloaded from <un.org>). 
87 Black, supra note 85 (quoting Naidoo).  The High-Level Panel 
suggested a terrorism definition: “any action, in addition to … {those in} 
existing conventions …, the Geneva Conventions and … {S.C. Res.} 
1566, that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians 
or non-combatants.”  Rizvi, U.N. Treaty, supra note 68 (quoting the 
Panel).  The definition proposed by Annan is: “Any action constitutes 
terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to 
civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a 
population or compelling a government or an international organization 
to do or abstain from doing any act.”  Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 
65 (quoting Annan).  Bolton’s proposed language involved “the targeting 
and deliberate killing of civilians … when the purpose …, but its nature 
or context, is to intimidate a population or compel a government or 
international organization {which} cannot be justified on any grounds 
….”  Patrick Goodenough, U.N. Summit Document Won’t Define 
Terrorism, Sept. 14, 2005 (quoting Bolton) (downloaded from 
<CNSNews.com>).  No such definition, or any other, was adopted by the 
World Summit: see supra note 79 and accompanying text, infra. 
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vague “prevent” and “incitement” to punish a non-violent 
criticism88, and I would add that the obligation to “counter … 
ideologies” can be used to similar effect. 
 The Summit outcome document offered a therapeutic 
concession to developed countries, especially the U.S. and Britain, 
by promising to “make all efforts” towards yet another convention, 
and condemning “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, 
committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes.”89 
But, as Naidoo notes, Muslim nations scotched any definition of 
“terrorism” which prohibits attacks on civilians, a definition 
needed to make the statement in the Summit document operative, 
for fear that such a definition would delegitimate, e.g., Palestinian 
self-determination efforts and rights to resist occupation.  Naidoo 
adds that some thought the ANC a terrorist organization, but it now 
governs South Africa.  Perhaps unconsciously echoing former 
President Reagan’s view of the Nicaraguan Contras, Naidoo 
concludes: “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom 
fighter.”90 While China and Russia want the U.N. to help 
coordinate anti-terrorism efforts, the Bush Administration (much 
like China and Russia, if they are honest) wants a carte blanche for 
unilateral action—with U.N. coordination only for “fringe” issues 
like money laundering.  Placing security above development, Bush 
has moved further away from multilateral aid, arguably to 
militarize and funnel aid to, e.g., Pakistan and Israel.  These are 
instances of regime rather than developmental support, huge 
“plunger” bets in pursuit of short-term game payoffs, rather than 
playing the more profitable, long-term ‘advanced poker’ that 
 
88 See Grice, supra note 86, Mithre Sondrasagrn, U.N. Terror 
Resolution Overly Vague, HWR Says, I.P.S., Sept. 14, 2005; Human 
Rights First, Security Council’s Counterterrorism Resolution Open to 
Abuse By Authoritarian Governments, n.d. (downloaded from 
<humanrightsfirst.org>).  See #41 (for Benin’s President, anti-terrorism 
requires scrupulous respect for state sovereignty, international human 
rights, and international humanitarian law); id. for Romania’s President, 
anti-terrorism can be “sustained” only by S.C. action).  But see 
Sondrasagra (quoting the Danish Prime Minister): “Freedom of speech 
… must never be an excuse for inciting terrorism and fostering hatred.” 
89 Black, supra note 83 (quoting the document). 
90 Id. (quoting Naidoo).  See Hughes, supra note ___; U.N. Set, supra 
note 37, supra.
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require a more equitable, broadly-based development.  At the same 
time, few believe the E.U.’s holier-than-thou rhetoric over 
development aid (either).91 Most treat it like any other bet in a 
short-term game, because it is not backed by reduction in the E.U. 
subsidies to European agriculture that leave most developing 
countries without access to European agricultural markets. 
Intervention 
 The Summit attempted to breathe new life into multilateral 
actions, in what proved to be an imperfect reform in organizational 
and nation-state priorities.  Perception of collective security threats 
have changed, with W.M.D., terrorism, humanitarian crises, 
disaster relief, discriminatory ideologies, genocide, and 
abductions—especially of aid workers, becoming more prominent 
as threats.  Also, complaints are prevalent that such interventions 
as occur are often arbitrary, that Security Council consensus 
resolutions are often too restrictive for a “robust” peacekeeping, 
and that donor peacekeeping aid usually arrives too late.  
Nonetheless, U.N. conflict prevention (and peacebuilding, infra)
efforts are becoming more numerous and more effective.  
Operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone ended more or less 
successfully in 2005, and a recent Rand Corp. study found 66% of 
U.N. peacekeeping efforts to be successful.  But even if, as some 
argue, the true figure is 40%, this is an achievement since 
collective peacekeeping did not really exist prior to the 1990s.92 
91 See Grice, supra note 86; Sanjay Suri, Political Strings Tie Up U.S. 
Aid, I.P.S., Sept. 24, 2005. 
92 Lederer, Global Violence, supra note 54.  See Chemillier-Gendreau, 
supra note 65; Power, supra note 51; Gordon Brown & Hilary Benn, 
Let’s Put On Some Institutional Muscle, INT. HERALD TRIB., Oct. 19, 
2005 (to deal with natural disasters, the following must be augmented 
and better coordinated—the emergency jurisdiction of the IMF and the 
World Bank, the U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
and the U.N. Emergency Revolution Fund); Howard LaFranchi, A
Welcome Surprise: War Waning Globally, THE CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 18, 2005 (read off <scmonitor.com>); Haider Rizvi, U.N. 
Blue Helmets Earn Applause—and Censure, I.P.S., Dec. 30, 2005; Yoo, 
supra note 8 (humanitarian crises include systematic human rights 
violations and the collapse of central authority—or hijacking by non-
state actors and involve individual liability as well as collective action 
problems).  Yoo, id.; arguably proves the reformers’ case when he notes 
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Summiteers sitting as the Security Council passed another 
Resolution unanimously, 1625, which is aimed at conflict 
prevention (especially in Africa) and calls for preventative 
diplomacy, regional mediation, an early-warning system for 
potential conflicts, promoting fairness and transparency in 
elections, and acting against the illegal exploitation of resources 
such as diamonds.93 Many also see a need to break the worldwide 
‘Hobbesian’ cycle of war-conquest-‘empire’-oppression-
succession-anarchy, and back to war.  This cycle is based on the 
incentives and capacities for a violent, collective self-help: for 
example, the ability to coerce would-be “free riders” and to attract 
an external support for your cause—or to create a unifying distrust 
of external opposition.  (These incentives and capacities can often 
be altered non-violently by, e.g., effective recognition of the right 
to self-determination).94 
Romeo Dalliare, the Canadian General who headed U.N. 
peacekeeping in Rwanda, complains that the “Mogadishu rule” (in 
effect since the U.S. pulled out of Somalia in 1990) governs: “the 
sense of responsibility to human beings” loses out “against the 
self-interested demands imposed by the governments and …by 
their peoples and structures.”95 In other words, the initial S.C. 
decision to play ‘advanced poker’ over Rwanda was later deserted 
by players whose support and resources the U.N. needed, players 
who were not altogether free agents since they operated under 
‘domestic’ strictures.  These deserting players thus reverted to 
short-term, non-peacekeeping (poker) games where perceived 
payoffs were greater.  Dalliare contrasts Rwanda with the self-
interested (ostensibly security-based) intervention in Yugoslavia, 
where people are white—‘like us’ and living closer to us.  He 
 
that between the Korean War and Iraqi War I (1991) 75-80% of deaths 
from violent conflict came from intrastate conflicts that the U.N. Charter 
drafters did not see as threats to peace. 
93 Security Council Meeting, supra note 86. 
94 Brietzke, Globalization, supra note 7; Paul Brietzke, Self-
Determination, Self-Determination, or Jurisprudential Confusion 
Exacerbating Political Conflict, 14 WIS. INT. L.J. 69 (1995) _____. 
 
95 Romeo Dalliare, interviewed by MOTHER JONES (Jan. 2005) 
(downloaded from <cbc.ca/news>). 
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concludes that conflict resolution requires more enlightened and 
multi-skilled peacekeeper/humanitarians, who must be given a firm 
S.C. mandate to protect the people caught between warring 
participants.96 
Interventions by another country (rather than the U.N.) are 
traditionally restricted to self-defense, or interventions otherwise 
permitted under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter.  Bush’s assertion of 
a unilateral right of anticipatory retaliation, especially as mis-
played during his Iraq poker hands, alerted the world community 
to the need for legal action.  The High-Level Panel thus 
recommended a five-pronged interpretive loosening of Chapter 7 
strictures, an effort Michael Glennon labels “wishful thinking.”97 
When this proposal is combined with the inability of the members 
of the International Criminal Court to define “aggression”, and 
with polls which show diverse national interpretations of “peace” 
(and even “development”, infra), Glennon concludes that a 
“legalist solution” to a profligate use of force is highly 
improbable.98 
96 Id.  See Somavia, supra note 67.  Humanitarian interventions require 
“a series of interlocking legal and logistical safeguards—shored up by 
the political will of countries … and operationalized through a coherent 
U.N. system …  functioning with NGOs and regional and local 
governments.  A separate convention (treaty) is needed to protect 
nongovernmental personnel affiliated with U.N. relief efforts, id.  But see 
Rizvi, supra note 68 (since the 1990 failure in Somalia, U.N. 
peacekeeping operations have become more aggressive and less 
“neutral”, in Haiti for example, resulting in the death of 91 peacekeepers 
in 2004). 
97 Michael Glennon, Idealism That Won’t Work (2005) (SSRN Pap. 
No. ___).  Glennon, id. lists the Panel’s five “criteria of legitimacy”: is 
the threat sufficiently serious, is the purpose proper, has every 
nonmilitary option been exhausted, is the military action proportionate to 
the threat, and is there a reasonable chance of success?  For Yoo, supra 
note ___, these criteria will not forestall the use of self-defense as a 
pretext for illegality.  Bush must have been irked when, during the World 
Summit, the new Iranian President called Bush’s anticipatory retaliation 
a “blatant contradiction to the very foundations o f the U.N. and the letter 
and spirit of its charter.”  Tyler Marshall, Iran Leader’s First U.N. 
Speech Has a Pretty Clear Target, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005. 
98 Glennon, supra note 19. 
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Nonetheless, Annan and, later, the World Summit outcome 
document, adopted a Canadian (and human rights NGOs’) 
initiative: the “responsibility to protect”, through uninhibited 
action, civilian populations against genocide or war crimes, when 
their governments are “unable or unwilling” to do so.99 This 
language was adopted despite assertions that it infringes state 
sovereignty, despite fears of endless S.C. debates—as over 
Rwanda and Darfur, and despite developing countries’ (including 
chronic human rights abusers’) fears that this “responsibility” 
would give major players (especially the U.S.) an excuse to 
intervene.  The thoughtful former U.N. High Commissioner for 
Human Rights and President of Ireland, Mary Robinson, praises 
this World Summit (game) move, while adding that it is only the 
single leg of a stool where the others failed to materialize: human 
rights improvements, control over trade in small arms (“the real 
W.M.D.’s”), and especially, progress over development; the G-8’s 
“triumphal announcements” came off “looking hollow.”100 
99 Black, supra note 83 (quoting the document).  See Iraz Hussein, Is 
the Glass of U.N. Reforms Half Full?, (Pakistan) DAILY TIMES, Oct. 7, 
2005 (read off <unwire.org>) (between 1827 and 1914, the U.S. 
intervened in Latin American countries 70 times on “humanitarian”/’duty 
to protect’ grounds; the “principle alone is not sufficient”); Sanders, 
supra note ___; Ward, U.N. Blocks, supra note ___; Main Divisive 
Issues, supra note 80. 
100 Robinson, supra note 72.  See Mark Turner, U.N. ‘Must Never Again 
be Found Wanting on Genocide’, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005 (for 
Zimbabwe’s Mugabe, “responsibility to protect” can be a cynical ploy in 
an aggressive foreign policy); #121 (quoting Rwanda’s Foreign Minister 
Murigande (will the document “lead to lengthy academic or legal debates 
on what constitutes genocide or crimes against humanity, while people 
die?”); id. (the U.N. has “consistently neglected to learn from its 
mistakes” in, e.g., Rwanda); Brinkbaumer & Muscala, supra note ___; 
Ward, U.N. Backs, supra note 47; Better Than Nothing, supra note 75.  
On development and the G8, see notes ___ and accompanying text, infra. 
While the Bush Administration has moved too slowly over Darfur, a 
no-fly zone has not been imposed, and there has been no NATO 
deployment.  But the U.N. is even slower.  Darfur’s Despair, supra note 
82; Editorial: Negotiating With Genocide, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 9, 
2005, B6; Main Divisive, supra note 80.  U.S. Ambassador Bolton (plus 
China, Algeria, and Russia) thus blocked a U.N. envoy from briefing the 
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Peacebuilding 
 
The (post-conflict) Peacebuilding Commission is an 
important World Summit reform which generated no reported 
disagreements during negotiations.  Perhaps this is because the 
Commission formalizes and institutionalizes steps already being 
pursued by consensus, sometimes as  logical extensions of more 
overt interventions and now to create an in-house expertise and 
training in mediation and “good offices.”  Past efforts show how 
non-violent interventions by third parties can bridge deep hatreds 
to build communication and trust among the parties.  U.N. 
mediators have helped free hostages, resolve border and electoral 
disputes, and forge peace agreements in the Cambodia, El 
Salvador, and Guatemala of the 1990s.  In particular, Lakhdar 
Brahimi navigated deep ethnic and political divisions while 
creating the “road map” for Afghan governance.101 
As an effort which overlaps some U.N. Development 
Program (U.N.D.P.) projects, $42 million has been raised from 39 
countries—and especially from the U.S., India, and Australia—to 
create a new Democracy Fund (U.N.D.E.F.).  The idea is to fill in 
the gaps experienced by countries in transit from some kind of 
authoritarianism.  The anticipated projects include: the creation of 
civil societies; the rule of law; political parties; independent courts; 
a “free press”; trades unions; enhanced monitoring, evaluation, and 
auditing capacities; more professionalized civil and military 
establishments; and programs to safeguard the rights of women, 
children, and minorities.  No particular democratic model will be 
endorsed, no (IMF- or World Bank-style) conditionality will be 
imposed on the aid given, and the Fund will report to the General 
Assembly.  Both of these reforms look like useful ways to 
restructure domestic games, to make an ‘advanced poker’ more 
 
S.C. about human rights violations in Darfur: action rather than talk is 
required. 
101 La Franchi, supra note ___; Lederer, Global Violence, supra note 
(43}; Editorial: Making Peace Work, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005. 
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common and more likely to yield cooperative, positive-sum 
outcomes.102 
Non-Proliferation 
 
In contrast to the peacebuilding successes described in the 
last two paragraphs, Secretary-General Annan noted that the World 
Summit “could not even agree on a paragraph on non-proliferation 
and disarmament, and I … {find this} a disgrace and a real 
failure.”103 We might see in this the same kind of failure described 
earlier and later: too many players preoccupied with (perhaps 
misperceived) short-term gains potentially available from smaller, 
non-‘advanced poker’ (uncooperative, zero-sum) games.104 As 
things stand, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) allows the U.S., 
Britain, France, China, and Russia to possess nuclear weapons, but 
requires them to disarm.  Other state-parties are strictly prohibited 
from having them.  India, Pakistan, and Israel have not signed the 
NPT however, and North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2002.  
Nuclear-free countries supported the NPT in the past because of 
the nuclear “haves’” promise to disarm, but this is being 
undermined by Bush’s refusal to disarm, by other Bush/Bolton 
actions105, by Russia106, and by actions of others.  The most 
 
102 Ayesha Gooneratne, U.N. Launches New Democracy Fund, I.P.S., 
Oct. 12, 2005.  See notes ___ and accompanying text, supra (‘advanced 
poker’).  But see also Robin Wright, Middle East Democracy Summit 
Ends in Rancor, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 12, 2005 9:38 A.M.: Bush’s 
Forum for the Future, held in Bahrain, ended without a formal agreement 
on democracy promotion, Egypt—thought to be dependent on U.S. 
foreign aid—insisting on Arab governments’ control over which 
democracy groups receive aid. 
103 Nick Wahams, General Assembly OKs Compromise Document, ASK 
JEEVES, Sept. 13, 2005, 10:10 (downloaded from <ask.com>) (quoting 
Annan). 
104 See text following note ___ {51) supra; notes ___ and 
accompanying text, infra.
105 Xin Benjian, Who’s Pushing Nuclear Proliferation, PEOPLE’S DAILY 
ONLINE, Oct. 27, 2005 (the 44-member Nuclear Suppliers Group, which 
exerts export controls—especially when the importer has not signed the 
NPT—turned down the U.S. request to offer access to India); id. (this 
attempt makes it more difficult for the U.S. to win support from the 
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dangerous ‘other’ is Pakistani scientist and black marketeer, A.Q. 
Khan.  He facilitated a proliferation by North Korea, a potential 
proliferation by Iran and Libya, and by who knows where else, 
feeling that Muslim countries had their nuclear weapons desires 
thwarted while Israel and India were given free rein.107 He is such 
a nationalist hero as to be untouchable by the international 
community—so long as he stays in Pakistan. 
 
international community to not supply North Korea and Iran); Hudson, 
supra note ___ (“The U.S. seeks to reinterpret the NPT as legitimizing 
the possession of weapons by existing nuclear states, while using it as the 
justification for confrontation with states accused of proliferation.”); id. 
(countries resent this “do-what-we-say-not-as-we-do” attitude); id. (the 
U.S. proposes to develop new nukes, for use even against non-nuclear 
states); id. (the question arises—“who exactly are we deterring?”); 
Colum Lynch, Bolton Criticizes Bill Withholding U.N. Funds, 
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 28, 2005, A20 (asked in Congress why he 
didn’t strike deals at the Summit for non-proliferation of biological and 
chemical weapons, Bolton said “We ‘tried very hard’ but were opposed 
by countries who saw the U.S. rather than rogue states  as the prime 
proliferators); Jacques Hymans, Think Again: Nuclear Proliferation, 
FOREIGN POLICY, Nov. 2005 (read off <foreignpolicy.com>) (Americans 
“squander” non-proliferation opportunities through a … tendency to 
lecture rather than to listen.”). 
106 E.g., Ted Turner & Stanley Weiss, Avoiding A Russian Arms 
Disaster, WASHINGTON TIMES, Nov. 6, 2005 (downloaded from 
<washingtontimes.com>) (half of Russia’s weapons-grade nuclear 
materials are poorly protected, as are shells of VX and Sarin nerve gas, 
and the Nunn/Lugar program that has eliminated some Russian nukes is 
now under threat from Congress). 
107 Douglas Frantz, From Patriot to Proliferator, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 
2005. See Hudson, supra note ___ (in 1996, the International Court of 
Justice called for nuclear disarmament obligation to be met); Sanders, 
supra note ___ (in light of the U.N. Charter pledge ‘to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war”, the U.S. ‘failure to agree on 
disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation is a woeful foreboding that 
conflicts will get worse not better.”).  But see Hyman, supra note 105, 
supra. (Since the end of the Cold War, more nations have given up 
nuclear arsenals than have created new ones); id. (the nonproliferation 
regime has not been as successful as advertised, since the vast majority 
of states simply has no interest in doing what the N.D.T. prohibits). 
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The reformist heavy lifting in this area was helped along by 
an NGO: the Nobel Committee awarded the 2005 Peace Prize to 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its head, 
Egyptian lawyer Mohamed El Baradei.  This Prize was both a slap 
at the U.S. and a warning that the serious threats posed by Khan, 
North Korea, Iran, et al. can only be met through international 
cooperation—rather than unilateral or collaborative action from 
within the major players.  (The U.S. had opposed El Baradei’s re-
election because of his behavior concerning Iran, until it became 
clear that there was no other suitable candidate; and the U.S. later 
purported to find in his Nobel Prize a warning to Iran.)  
Particularly innovative and deserving of global support is El 
Baradei’s new proposal: countries which do not yet have nuclear 
weapons should forbear producing nuclear fuel for at least ten 
years.  Fuel would be supplied (and disposed of later) by a country 
already having nukes, with the IAEA as the supplier/disposer of 
last resort.  The IAEA seems to do its best work when given 
unfettered access108—which is not the case in North Korea and 
Iran, where various nation-state players claim primacy.  The IAEA 
could be understood as claiming a seat at the poker table, helping 
to guide play in more ‘advanced’ (cooperative/positive-sum) 
directions.   
 The World Summit Draft outcome document asked 
governments to take action against organized crime, as well as 
against the proliferation of small arms—“the real WMD”, 
according to Mary Robinson109—and of land mines.  145 nations 
have ratified the Landmine [non-proliferation] Treaty, the product 
of the Campaign that won the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize, and 
 
108 Deen, supra note 37; David Holley, Nuclear Chief Offers a 
Nonproliferation Plan: Promise Them Fuel, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005; 
Despite Prize, Nuclear Agency Flawed, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 12, 2005; 
Nuclear Watchdog Wins Nobel Peace Prize, AP, in INT. HERALD TRIB., 
Oct. 7, 2005; Short-Lived Celebration, supra note 53.  But see Hymans, 
supra note 105 (while the nonproliferation regime is billed as successful, 
the fact is that most countries do not want the bomb in question anyway); 
id. (the IAEA regime is “flimsy”, suffering from “ambiguous and 
erratically enforced rules, a myriad of technical loopholes, and chronic 
underfunding.”). 
109 Robinson, supra note 72.  
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performance under the Treaty has been relatively good.  But 
regrettably, the Pentagon may soon produce two higher-tech 
landmines.110 To allow Annan the last word, the “non-
proliferation regime” is “unraveling” because “we have allowed 
posturing to get in the way of results.”111 (Posturing can be 
understood as a relatively insubstantial poker bet, which is treated 
as such by the other players.) 
 
Administration—and a Sidebar. 
 
Paul Volker, the head of the oil-for-food investigating 
Commission, which convinced most U.N. members of the urgency 
of administrative reform (sidebar, infra), found that Secretary-
General Annan’s “cumulative management performance” fell short 
of the standard the U.N. “should strive to maintain.”112 The 
putative keeper of the better natures at the U.N., Annan thus 
continued his attempts to rebuild U.N. legitimacy, at a time when 
his own political and moral authority was at its weakest.  Many 
problems stem from the U.N. bureaucrats’ inbred and cosseted (by 
diplomatic immunity) existence.  Bureaucratic positions are filled 
by nationality rather than merit in an atmosphere of secrecy and 
unaccountability, and many U.N. goals get compromised by a 
bureaucratic unwillingness or inability to implement them.  Except 
for improved security measures, to forestall the recurrence of 
events like the Baghdad explosion that killed Sergio de Mello and 
other valued U.N. officials, Annan managed only partial reforms 
before the World Summit.  These earlier reforms nonetheless left 
U.N. bureaucrats—most of whom have little faith in their 
seniors—with their morale further damaged.  The World Summit 
(thus) approved Annan’s additional reforms, under his claimed 
goals of improving U.N. integrity, impartiality, and its capacity to 
deliver: an internal ethics office, especially to resolve conflict-of-
interest problems; strengthening the Office of Internal Oversight 
 
110 Human Rights Watch, Back in Business?: U.S. Landmine Production 
and Exports, Aug. 2005 (briefing paper, which can be downloaded from 
<hrw.org>).  
111 Hussain, supra note __ (quoting Annan).  See Black, supra note 83.  
112 Bill Berkowitz, At Sixty, It’s Uneasy Times for the U.N., I.P.S., Nov. 
10, 2005 (quoting Volker). 
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Services, and other auditing, etc. programs designed to increase 
efficiency; a one-time buyout of the least competent U.N. 
bureaucrats; an independent and external evaluation committee; 
and increased uniformity over which documents are made public, 
with a bias towards an increased transparency in the U.N. 
Secretariat.  These were the reforms the U.S. and other major 
funders of the U.N. wanted, and they were adopted despite minor 
players’ suspicions that they would be used by their advocates, 
especially the U.S., to control the Secretary General.  Developing 
country worries were well-placed, to the extent that budgetary and 
other major administrative controls are being removed from the 
General Assembly that the developing countries dominate.113 This 
looked like a straight zero-sum (not an ‘advanced’) poker game, 
with developed (U.N.-funding) countries able to out-bid the 
developing ones. 
 As mentioned earlier114, the oil-for-food sidebar provoked 
shameless exaggeration of the extent of corruption, and of Annan’s 
role in it, in a failed American neoconservative quest for the 
Secretary-General’s head—because he approved of the S.C.’s 
denial of permission for Iraqi War II.  (Under this sidebar, Iraq was 
permitted to circumvent the sanctions installed after Iraqi War I, by 
selling oil in order to buy food and medicine).  The Reports of the 
Volker Commission investigating this sidebar also encouraged the 
administrative reforms discussed in the last paragraph.  These 
Reports fault Annan for seeking administrative review of oil-for-
food through the S.C., rather than an outside investigation of the 
 
113 Brown, supra note 15; Chesterman, supra note 50;  Deen, U.N.’s 
Authority, supra note 84; 
Mitchell, supra note 75; Mark Turner, Envoys Fight to Keep U.N. 
Reform Package on Track, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005 
(downloaded off <ft.com>); Nabal Toosi, Annan Defends Summit’s 
Accomplishments, Agrees Some Results Mixed, A.P., Oct. 17, 2005, 3:15 
P.M. E.D.T. (downloaded from <newsday.com>); Walker, supra note 
49; Ward, Frechette, supra note 47; Key Elements of U.N. Draft 
Document, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005; U.S. Fears Summit Will Gut U.N. 
Reform, Rights Plan, Reuters, Sept. 12, 2005 (downloaded from 
<AlertNet.com>).  See Turner; Volker, supra note __ (quoting in note 
115, infra; notes __ and accompanying text, infra (Group of 77’s 
opposition after the Summit. 
114 See note ___ and accompanying text, supra.
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scandal, and for not supervising his son Kojo—who profited from 
the corruption and then proved uncooperative with the Volker 
Commission.  But U.S., French, British, Russian, and Chinese 
representatives on the Security Council oversight committee 
approved the relevant oil-for-food transfers, while turning a blind 
eye to abuses.  (Russia received one-third of the oil.)  This 
corruption pales in comparison with that of the U.S. Coalition 
Provisional Authority in Iraq.  Among other things, $12 billion was 
withdrawn from the N.Y. Federal Reserve as 363 tons of $100
bills.  80% of another large disbursement could not be accounted 
for.  Fortunately, a neoconservative American attempt to find 
corruption in U.N. tsunami funds, has gone nowhere.115 
Saddam profited to the extent of $250-600 million per year, 
including “kickbacks” from Volvo, Siemens, Daimler Chrysler, 
Coastal Petroleum of Houston, and 2,400 other firms; and from the 
sales of oil smuggled through Jordan, Syria, and Turkey.  Neither 
the kickbacks nor the smuggling was part of the U.N. oil-for-food 
program, and U.S. and British intelligence had to know of the 
smuggling—impossible to conceal from overflights and 
satellites—and of the many diplomatic bags stuffed with cash that 
moved in the opposite direction.  Nevertheless, Annan accepted 
responsibility for these scandals and the attendant design, auditing, 
and management failures.  But having mended his Washington 
fences with all but the extremists, Annan then got outspoken 
support from almost all U.N. members.  This is appropriate: 
differences among countries impeded supervision and operated to 
tolerate corruption.  What ensued were ‘unofficial’ poker games 
among some nation-states, individuals (especially Saddam), and 
 
115 Doreen Carvajal and Andrew Kramer, Report on Oil-for-Food 
Scheme Gives Details of Bribes to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005; 
Maggie Farley, U.N. Oil-for-Food Inquiry Findings Surprised Volker, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005; Colum Lynch, Oil-for-Food Probe: U.N. 
Needs Overhaul to Stop Fraud, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 7, 2005, A20; 
Lynch, U.N. Panel Says 2,400 Firms Paid Bribes to Iraq, WASHINGTON 
POST, Oct. 28, 2005, A16; Mark Turner, Volker Set to Call for Reform of 
U.N. Leadership, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, 21; 51; Walker, supra 
note 49; Ian Williams, The Sound of Silence: As in Dogs Not Barking, 
Maximsnews.com, Dec. 30, 2005. 
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corporations shamelessly devoted to making of money at the 
expense of dishonoring U.N. ideals and eroding the public’s 
support for them.  No one was in charge (a hallmark of poker) and 
no one emerged covered in glory.116 
Interrelated (?) Human Rights and Development 
 In a thoughtful article, Philip Alston argues that 
development and human rights advocates should pay much more 
attention to each other’s concerns, which are linked by a “virtual 
tautology”: the “U.N. approach of indivisibility”117 that arguably 
informs the entire reform effort.  Human rights and development 
advocates should “engage more effectively”, share their 
“imagination and energy”, “prioritize” between themselves, reduce 
the gap between rhetoric and actual programs that both groups 
share, and work to increase the capacities of “duty-bearers” to 
meet obligations and of “rights-holders” to claim the fruits of these 
obligations.118 Mary Robinson calls extreme poverty the most 
serious form of human rights violation, especially given the ways 
poor countries use their scarce resources119—in no small measure 
because of strictures imposed by the IMF, the World Bank, and 
private foreign investors and lenders.  Unfortunately, the poker 
metaphor predicts Alston’s conclusion—human rights and 
development advocates are  “ships passing in the night:”120 
116 Lynch, U.N. Panel, supra note 115; David Lynch, Report Details 
Kickbacks for Iraq, USA TODAY, Oct, 27, 2005, 12:30 A.M.; Walker, 
supra note 49; Probe Finds Illicit, Unethical Corrupt Oil-for-Food 
Operation, USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 2005, 12:55 A.M.  See Turner, Volker, 
supra note ___ (quoting Mark Malloch Brown) (“Entrenched interests 
inside the organization” the U.N., “a wish that all of this would go away 
and that it could settle back into comfortable mediocrity again.”). 
117 Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the 
Human Rights and Development Seen Through the Lens of the 
Millennium Development Goals, 27 H. RT. Q., 755, 784-85 (2005). See 
Security Council Meeting, supra note 86 (quoting French P.M. 
deVillepin) (calling for “resolute action” at the World Summit “on 
everything that fuels terrorism—the inequalities, the persistence of 
violence, injustices and conflicts, the lack of understanding among 
cultures,” since force “does not address the roots of evil.”). 
118 Alston, supra note 117, at 755-56, 770, 790. 
119 Id. at 786-87 (quoting Robinson). 
120 Id. at 825.  
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different players in different games are pursuing different gains in 
different ways, forestalling what is perhaps Secretary-General 
Annan’s mega-‘advanced poker’ of cooperation and coordination 
in pursuit of security as well as human rights and development. 
 Human rights may be “open-ended, contingent and … 
subjective,”121 but they are much less so than the World Summit’s 
treatment of them.  They were potentially improved as an ancillary 
effect of establishing the Peacebuilding Commission, and of 
creating the “responsibility to protect” against genocide or war 
crimes.  On the other hand, human rights were seriously damaged 
by the lack of progress over non-proliferation and implementation 
of the Millennium Development Goals (infra), and slightly injured 
by the (slight, it turned out) emphasis on terrorism.  Secretary-
General Annan had called for reform of the Human Rights 
Commission into the “third pillar” of the U.N. (along with the 
General Assembly and the Security Council) because of that 
Commission’s “declining credibility and professionalism.”122 The 
reformed body should operate continuously, rather than the current 
six weeks per year term that is conducive only to grand but 
superficial gestures; given more time, effective monitoring of 
countries’ human rights undertakings would be possible.  Also, 
membership in the body should be reserved to countries making 
real contributions to human rights.123 
In 2004, the Human Rights Commission refused to act over 
abuses by China, Iran or Zimbabwe, or by Russia in Chechnya.  
Chaired by Libya, the 2004Commission had Zimbabwe as a 
member and re-elected Sudan during its Darfur abuses, having 
earlier refused to re-elect the U.S.  (This reminds me of Lyndon 
Johnson’s response to criticism over appointing Admiral Hyman 
Rickover to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: “Wouldn’t you 
rather have him inside the tent pissing out than outside the tent 
pissing in?”)  This re-election failure of the U.S. attracted the 
enmity of neoconservatives, and the apparent top priority of the 
 
121 Id. at 760.  
122 Human Rights Watch, U.N. Reform Q and A (n.d.) (downloaded 
from <hrw.org>) (quoting Annan) (hereinafter Q & A].  See Brown, 
supra note 15; Q & A; Security Council Meeting, supra note 86 (quoting 
deVillepin in note 105, supra). 
123 Q & A, supra note 122 (quoting Annan). 
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Bush Administration during the World Summit was to punish a 
Commission showing this much independence—by destroying it.  
The Commission repaid this favor by appointing eight independent 
human rights experts aggressively to evaluate the rights record of 
the U.S. over the past five years—as part of the Commission’s 
regular evaluation cycle.  Investigated are the worldwide treatment 
of ‘terrorist’ detainees, the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act and the copycat 
laws it spawns worldwide, the Iraqi tribunal trying Saddam and his 
colleagues, the death penalty, and other shortcomings. Admission 
of the U.N. experts to U.S. prisons in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Guantanamo has been denied by the U.S.  The Mickeljohn Civil 
Liberties Institute at Berkeley documented 180 alleged human 
rights violations by the U.S., and 19 alleged violations of human 
rights duties by the federal government.124 
The World Summit missed an important reform 
opportunity, by referring key decisions about a Human Rights 
Council (to replace the Commission) to the General Assembly 
(G.A.) for action.  This move was supported by Russia, China, 
Egypt, Pakistan, and some other countries concerned about their 
human rights record.  Only the Summit’s doubling of the budget 
for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (the 
capable Louise Arbour is the current High Commissioner) is 
regarded as adding (a minimal) content to reform.  It seems clear 
that opposition to making human rights protections more effective 
among three of the four major players left the matter all-but-
unreformed within the fifth major player.  Some criticized the U.S. 
for trying to remove from the Commission countries hostile to U.S. 
interests, and for U.S. support of some human rights-abusing 
 
124 supra note110; Thalif Deen, U.N./Human Rights Body to Scrutinize 
U.S. Abuses, I.P.S., Sept. 20, 2005. See Hughes, supra note __ (quoting 
language from Bush’s World Summit speech which echoes some of 
Annan’s ideas); La Franchi, supra note 101 (quoting John Norris, of the 
International Crisis Group) (recent human rights progress through 
“international actions against high-profile violators like Serbia’s 
Slobodan Milosevic or Liberia’s Charles Taylor); U.N. Envoy Cautions 
on China Rights, BBC News, Sept. 12, 2005 (Louise Arbour, text 
accompanying note __, infra, concerned about China’s detaining 
journalists, labor activists, and ethnic minorities, and about the treatment 
of Tibetans and Muslim neighbors). 
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regimes, but an E.U. official called the new Council “a simple 
name-change.”125 Trying to put a brave face on this non-reform, 
Mark Malloch Brown said that the new Council offered reform 
leverage within the G.A., for countries that really care about 
human rights.  Activists’ calls for a human rights court (like that of 
the E.U., rather than a Commission or Council), or for a court 
combining this function with the International Court of Justice and 
the International Criminal Court, are unlikely to go anywhere for 
some time to come.126 
* * * * * *
Lack of progress on development during the September 
2005 World Summit, and the failure effectively to plan 
implementation of the Millennium Development Goals in 
particular, is perhaps the clearest illustration this article offers of 
how something like a (cooperative, positive-sum) ‘advanced 
poker’ can give way under the lure of possibly winning smaller 
gains more quickly in zero- sum, ordinary poker ways.  At first 
glance, this is because of the limited altruism displayed by most 
developed countries; Canada, Holland, and the Scandinavian 
countries are worthy exceptions.  This altruism is mostly exhausted 
on the plight of fellow-citizens rather than on far-away 
‘strangers’—unless the foreigners’ are victimized by some 
mediagenic disaster perhaps.  Also, middle-income countries like 
India and Brazil can expect little in the way of increased 
development aid and are, rather, worried about tougher human 
rights standards and a dilution of their influence at the U.N.  
 
125 Evelyn Leopold & Paul Taylor, U.N. Assembly Approves Weekend 
Summit Blueprint, WASHINGTON POST, Reuters, Sept. 13, 2005, 7:52 
P.M. (quoting Benita Ferrero-Waldner).  See Power, supra note 51; 
Deen, U.N. Human Rights, supra note 124; id. (quoting Norman 
Solomon, of the D.C. Institute for Public Accuracy) (the U.S. “is among 
the most culpable of human rights violators”); id. (“A superpower that is 
striving to remake” the U.N. “in its own image can hardly be expected to 
submit to institutional scrutiny of its actual human rights record.”); 
Hussain, supra note __; Evelyn Leopold, U.S. Fears Summit Will Get 
U.N. Reform Rights Plan, REUTERS ALERT NET, Sept. 12, 2005, 18:42 
GMT; Haider Rizvi, supra note 65; Mark Turner, Envoys Fight to Keep 
UN Reform Package on Track, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, 03:00. 
126 Brown, supra note 15; Human Rights Watch, Key Human Rights 
Proposals Stymied, Sept. 13, 2005. 
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International law thus continues to honor voluntary redistributions 
(by aid “donors”, perhaps through what are called M.D.G. 
“development compacts”) but almost never creates a legal 
obligation of redistribution.127 Such an obligation could be 
imposed as a matter of developed country status rather than 
contract, but it would be almost impossible to enforce this 
obligation under governance without a government, or to 
determine the relative rights and obligations of middle-income 
countries. 
 Unfortunately, this international law and practice of a 
voluntary and thus limited altruism is badly out of step with a well-
informed reality.  While development is a “public good”: initially, 
a perception which encourages many developed countries to be 
“free riders” who reap diffuse benefits without bearing focused 
 
127 Alston, supra note 117, at 777, 786, 825; Posner, supra note 8; 
Turner, 13.  For example, an $88 million U.N. appeal concerning 
starvation caused by draught in Malawi, contemporaneous with the 
World Summit, attracted government pledges after three weeks, where 
$1/day would save a life.  Malawi Appeal Gets _____, BBC _____. 
 Similarly, the 2005 aid shortfall at the U.N. High Commission for 
Refugees and the U.N. World Food Program (WFP) is $219 million and 
$182 million respectively.  African Refugees, ___________. 
Developed countries spend more in a week to subsidize their own 
farmers than they spend in a year to help starving children.  U.N. Warns 
______.  The WFP requested bids from the ten largest reinsurance 
companies, in a pilot scheme to insure Ethiopia against draught.  Mark 
Turner, U.N. Move to Insure Against Drought, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 
15, 2005, 03:00.  (Such insurance is necessary only because of limited 
altruism, since a global self-insurance by all of us would save much 
money in terms of reinsurance company profits.)  In contrast, a proposed 
insurance fund for foreign investors in Gaza (Kessler, supra note 23) 
makes sense regardless of altruism, since this bind of private-sector 
insurance is commonly thought essential to investment in developing 
countries and commonly arranged through a division of the World Bank.  
But see also Linus Atarak, World Bank Chief Says Africa is First 
Priority, I.P.S., (quoting Wolfowitz) (discussing developed countries 
“obligation” to help developing countries without describing how the 
obligation can be enforced); id. (“uncomfortable” for developing 
countries to give up subsidies during Doha negotiations, but this is far 
less serious than the “daily … deprivation” these subsidies generate 
among “the poorest.”). 
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costs128, development also spawns significant benefits which can 
be directly appropriated by individuals, NGOs, and developing and
developed countries in the long run.  Development results in more 
goods and services being produced, traded, and consumed of 
course; and also in a greater citizen tolerance, a willingness to 
settle disputes peacefully (especially if good rules and courts are in 
place), a democratic inclination, and the greater energy and 
happiness that flow from improving living standards.  After all, 
this is the promise of modernism, Max Weber’s for example, 
which is why post-modernism is unpopular in the Third World: 
people there want to experience extensive material benefits before 
feeling “alienated” from them.  (In contrast, economic stagnation 
or decline is conducive to frustration, friction and, sometimes, 
ethnic strife, authoritarianism, and a swelling of terrorist ranks.)  
From this perspective, two central developmental problems 
remain: Western politics has an overwhelmingly short-term 
orientation which is ill-suited to development issues, an orientation 
marked by two- and four-year election cycles in the U.S. for 
example; and large gaps in the agendas and priorities among 
countries result in too little of the cooperation essential to a 
sustained ‘advanced poker.’129 Such gaps spawned what South 
Africa’s Mbeki termed a “half-hearted, timid, and tepid” World 
Summit130, and also paralysis and apparent deadlock (as of this 
writing) in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, and widespread 
dissatisfaction with the (anti-) developmental behavior of the IMF 
and the World Bank.  The remedy proposed later is a 
reinvigoration of the rules of liberal internationalism, to further 
 
128 At the World Summit, the Presidents of China and Indonesia 
stressed the importance of a global cooperation, without which 
development efforts are bound to fail.  GA/10381. (Cooperation with 
people otherwise excluded from the development process is particularly 
important to success.  Arndt.  See notes ____ and accompanying text, 
supra. 
129 BENJAMIN FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC 
GROWTH (2005); Shiffer & Hakim, Why the Rich Must Get Richer, THE 
ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 2005, 87. 
130 South Africa’s Mbeki (discussing the lack of resources for the poor 
to extricate themselves from misery and the related need for developed 
countries to go beyond traditional definitions of “security.”   
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embed a global ‘advanced poker’ through a mature understanding 
of our long-term interests and needs.131 
The Millennium Development Goals (M.D.G.s; see the 
Appendix) were to be the focus of the September 2005 World 
Summit, accounting as they did for half of the Summit draft (pre-
negotiations) outcome document.  Secretary-General Annan 
observed that “[n]ations must tear down the walls that separated 
the developed and developing world,”132 and Roger Coate speaks 
of a “system-wide initiative to raise people out of hell-like 
conditions.”133 Helen Tombo and Kevin Watkins discuss the 
reality of a global inequality: 2.5 billion people currently live on 
less than $2 per day, with 1.2 billion of these living at a lower 
“poverty” level.134 Projections indicate that 800 million will still 
live in poverty in 2015 (the anticipated end of the M.D.G. process), 
380 million more than the relevant M.D.G. Target stipulates.  In 
2005, we are five years into the twenty year M.D.G. process, and 
50 countries (900 million people) already make little or no 
progress toward one or more M.D.G. targets, a lag which 
undermines progress in meeting the other targets.  The projected 
non-attainment of another Target by 2015 means that an additional 
41 million children will die needlessly; a child currently dies every 
three seconds, a mother dies every minute during childbirth, and 
25,000 people die from starvation every day.  More than one 
billion people lack access to a safe water supply, and 2.6 billion 
 
131 See notes ___ and accompanying text, infra. 
132 Sixteenth General Assembly Plenary, United Nations General 
Assembly, World Leaders at General Assembly Summit Urged to 
Persevere, Take Bold Steps to Tackle Urgent Challenges, As Lives of 
Millions Hang in the Balance, (GA/10379) (quoting Annan). 
133 Coate, supra note 1. 
134 Helen Tombo, Global Call to Action Against Poverty, _____; Isaac 
Baker, Time for a “Decisive Breakthrough, UN Urges, IPS, Sept. 7, 
2005; United Natnins Development Programme Bulletin, More Aid, Pro-
Poor Trade Reform, and Long-Term Peace-Building Vital to Ending 
Extreme Poverty, MDG, Sept. 7, 2005 (quoting Kevin Watkins, a lead 
author of the 2005 UNDP Human Development Report). 
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lack access to sanitation, yet rich countries give half as much 
development aid (in real terms) as they gave in 1960.135 
A significant departure from previous approaches to 
development, the M.D.G.s captured the imagination and energy of 
international agencies, developing countries, and NGOs.  
Mobilization of these organizations is sought to generate national 
reports that describe development priorities—many of the reports 
already drafted make no reference to human rights—and also 
voluntary “development compacts” between a developing country 
and developed countries.  Transparency and a great deal of 
publicity are thought essential to keeping the countries and 
organizations’ feet to the developmental fire, but coverage of the 
M.D.G. process by mainstream media has been disappointing so 
far.136 
Conflicts over development priorities and techniques 
emerged soon after the consensus (‘advanced poker’) promulgation 
of the M.D.G.s in 2000.  A few countries, led by the U.S., continue 
to advocate the “free-market model” of ‘development’ (really, the 
pursuit of economic growth) that reigned in the 1990s, after the 
demise of many communist party-states and the erosion of the 
means to finance “welfare” measures in social democracies.  
(Family planning was deleted from the M.D.G.s prior to their 
promulgation, to appease American neoconservatives and the 
Vatican, despite the essential role of population control in attaining 
M.D.G. targets among the least developed countries.)  In contrast, 
many developed and almost all developing countries pursue goals 
which are ignored de facto by markets and their advocates: rather 
modestly redressing inequalities in favor of the poor and 
powerless, and forestalling the economic instabilities characteristic 
of an unregulated capitalism—particularly the “premature” 
marketization that the IMF and the World Bank demand from 
developing countries (infra).  The U.S. thus winds up pursuing free 
trade at the expense of generous development aid (aid supplied 
subject to conditions which make the relatively small sums less 
 
135 Tombo, supra note 134, 124 supra note ___;  Baker, supra note 134.  
See Penderio (quoting a WHO official, the shortfall in achieving M.D.G. 
health targets to date is “staggering.”). 
136 Alston, supra note 117, at 756, 777, 780, 786; Diana Cariboni, 
Poverty Missing From the News Agenda, I.P.S., Nov. 22, 2005. 
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effective), while the E.U. supports relatively generous aid at the 
expense of a potentially more valuable free trade—especially in 
agriculture.  Russia and China (the other major players) passively 
support the developmental strategy of the majority, while the 
World Bank now speaks of an oxymoronic “market-driven 
equality.”137 
137 See Chemillier-Gendreau, The Alternative U.N., supra note 65; 
Shirin, World Bank Calls for Market-Driven Equality, IPS, Sept. 20, 
2005; Marcela Valente, Civil Society Forum-A Sham?, IPS, Sept. 9, 
2005; Deen, Family; Stephen King.  There is too little development 
aid—adjusted for inflation, it has not increased yet.  African countries 
are dependent on it—agriculture has been neglected recently, too much 
aid is absorbed by consultants from the donor country, and effectiveness 
is reduced by the overlaps created by a failure to coordinate donors’ 
programs.  Dugger, supra note ___; Sachs at 7; The Foreign Aid Gap.  
Even the U.S. HIV/AIDS program is bilateral and channels funds 
according to U.S. strategic interests.  
 Free trade maximizes output from given inputs, but says nothing 
about the distribution of that output.  Stephen King.  According to the 
World Bank’s Wolfowitz, “inequity” most often happens when markets 
are missing, imperfect or failing.  But the M.D.G.s are driven by the idea 
that lack of development does not flow from a lack of trade, but from a 
lack of capital and geographic, political or technological constraints, 
King.  According to Social Watch, the resulting poverty stems from an 
inequality of access to income, power, job opportunities, information, 
social services, and political participation.  This amounts to Amartya 
Sen’s deprivation of basic capabilities, measurable under the Social 
Watch Index: the proportion of births attended by skilled health 
personnel, the under-5 infant mortality rate (which grows worse in 56 
countries), and the proportion of children in school through the fifth 
grade.  Cariboni.   
 Martin Ravallian, Inequality Is Bad for the Poor, World Bank 
Research Paper 4677 (Aug. 2005): Economic growth and trade are 
distribution-neutral, often inequality-promoting, and thus they have less 
of the “welfare impact” associated with development.  Care must be used 
in deplacing poverty reduction (rather than inequalities reduction as 
such) programs, lest redistributive policies inhibit growth and create 
additional economic distortions.”  “Win-win policies” are the solution, 
policies that eliminate inhibitions on growth which are also serve to 
increase inequalities.  E.g.s are, fixing market and government failures, 
making institutions work better, improved infrastructures, and a better 
delivery of quality health and education which is more responsive to the 
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The World Summit M.D.G. outcome was spotty, but with 
an overall lack of progress in solving the collective action 
problems of development.  Optimists’ hopes that the M.D.G. 
process would rejuvenate multilateral behavior were thus 
dashed.138 Mary Robinson concludes that the M.D.G.s “now seem 
 
needs of the poor.  Id.  Inequality is the root cause of poverty in Latin 
America, Osara.  The halving of extreme poverty (M.D.G. Target 1) by 
2015 is unlikely in Brazil or Argentina, and attention to poverty occurs 
only through the election of progressive governments, id.  See World 
Bank Calls for Market-Driven Economy, IPS, Sept. 21, 2005, 03:28 
GMT (quoting Rick Rowden) (equality cannot come about through 
market-based privatization policies or without eliminating a gender-bias; 
Macon-Maskor (citing a recent ILO study about the growing 
“employment gap”, “jobless growth” in ‘booming Asian economies that 
increasingly underfund public heath); Tranovich (women are more likely 
to work in the “informal” sector, in the most precarious jobs with the 
lowest wages).  A term growing in popularity is “equity”: a move 
towards equality.  It amounts to “empty rhetoric conserving a regressive 
status quo”, without changes in institutions which allocate resources and 
economic opportunities.  Equity Promises. 
138 Paul Martin & Soraka Iyer of the Third World Network argues that 
the World Summit shows that world leaders are “isolated from … global 
poverty” and “appear … immune” to “mass mobilizations.”  Deen,  
supra note 69.  The Director of the U.N.’s Millennium Campaign, Salil 
Shetty, fears that the 2015 M.D.G. targets won’t be met as a whole, “not 
even in 100 years.”  World Must Act to Alleviate Crippling Debt and 
Rampant Poverty, Leaders Tell U.N. Summit, U.N. NEWS CENTRE, Sept. 
15, 2005 (Progress on meeting Target 1, halving poverty, is relatively 
good but “masks huge disparities across and within countries and 
regions”, and the low or inappropriate quality of aid, id.  This admitted 
progress on Target 1 is actually small in comparison with the global 
availability of human, financial, and technical resources.  Baker, supra 
note #124 and #128, citing the 2005 UNDP Human Development Report.  
Hussain, supra note ___: thus was the original purpose of the Summit 
subordinated to political and security interests.  See NGO (to the same 
effect).  However, the Summit “clearly created stronger support” for 
developed countries contributing 0.7% of their GNP for development 
aid, created innovative means of financing: e.g., a small tax on airline 
tickets.  Deen, Lost-Sum.  The World Summit outcome document did 
declare that gender equality, HIV/AIDS, and reproductive health must be 
kept at the top of the global agenda.  Deen, Giant.  The Summit also set 
2006] 
 
PLAYING POKER AT THE U.N. 
59
set to join the pile of broken pledges that mark the old U.N.’s 
history.”139 The Summit also ratified an earlier move by the 
wealthy G8 countries, which then received additional ratifications 
from International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) 
meetings.  After eight years of popular campaigning, through rock 
concerts, etc., the G8 agreed to $40-55 billion in debt relief for the 
twenty poorest countries.  This number would go as high as 38 
countries, but Kenya for example is deemed to have a 
“sustainable” debt burden.  The G8 action can be regarded as a 
follow-up on previous ‘advanced poker’ rounds of winning a 
partial debt forgiveness for the poorest countries, even though such 
steps violate the IMF’s “uniformity of treatment” rule.  Nothing 
was done about the fair amount of this debt that was used corruptly 
to finance elite lifestyles in the poorest countries, or about the 
economists’ “moral hazard” for the future: having had past debts 
forgiven, elites are likely to create new debt and use it 
inappropriately, in the expectation that the new debt will be 
forgiven as well.140 Instead of simply forgiving it, the debt could 
have been (but wasn’t) converted into supervised programs to 
finance the pursuit of M.D.G. targets.  G8 countries will likely 
debit this debt relief from the development aid they otherwise 
intend to give and, only one month after the Summit, at a WB 
meeting, they fell to quarreling (reverted to an ordinary, 0-sum 
poker) over who pays what, who is eligible for relief, and which 
conditions will be attached.  Belgium, Holland, and Norway fear 
that the costs of this debt abatement will not be fully funded by the 
G8, leaving the IMF and the WB with too little income to 
function.141 In other words, these international organizations 
 
up an International Financing Facility, to make development aid more 
predictable and accessible.  #24; 2005 World. 
139 Robinson, supra note 72. 
140 Posner, supra note 8.  See notes #94; #100; #132; Bad Loans.  The 
G8 countries are Russia, Britain, France, Germany, the U.S., Japan, Italy 
and Canada.  Philip Thornton, Rich Nations Finally Give Go-Ahead to 
Long-Awaited Agreement on Debt Relief, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 27, 
2005. 
141 See supra note 140; Atara, supra note 127. 
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“swapped the risk that poor countries will not repay their loans for 
the risk that rich countries will not redeem their promises.”142 
Many in the Third World would find a mixed blessing 
(rather than, say, a disaster) in the IMF and the WB having too 
little income to function.  Developing countries see their under-
representation in these international agencies as diminishing 
agency significance, and as fueling the need to circumvent them 
through, e.g., the G8 assumed to be more sympathetic—even 
though developing countries have no formal representation there.  
Strict IMF and WB policies are seen to curb development and 
democracy: politicians and bureaucrats must respond to these 
organizations’ strictures rather than to local electorates.  An NGO 
study shows that, of the 308 IMF and WB policies imposed on 
fifty countries, only eleven policies diverged from the 
“Washington [Reaganite, neoclassical economics] consensus” of 
strict monetary and fiscal policies, deregulation and privatization, 
and the premature opening to an international competition of 
capital, financial, labor, and product markets in developing 
countries.143 
Large WB projects in developing countries are bonanzas 
for multinational corporations and corrupt local politicians, but 
they do little for the poor—other than evict them from subsistence 
lands.  More than 70% of WB loans go to as few as twelve middle-
income countries, countries able to meet their capital needs 
through private markets.  This pattern is likely to continue—with 
WB President Wolfowitz recently touting a mega-project to supply 
electricity to Congo, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and South Africa—
despite the consensus that small projects better meet the needs of 
the poor, especially in water and energy and especially if the 
projects are made accountable to their ostensible beneficiaries.  
Like his predecessor, Wolfowitz pays lip-service to such projects 
and virtues.  A Dutch M.P. notes that parliamentarians must inform 
themselves and apply extra pressure to countries and the WB—so 
as to keep their games honest.  The story is much the same for the 
IMF.  Asian countries have accumulated huge foreign exchange 
 
142 Bad Loans, supra note 140.  
143 World Bank/IMF Losing Relevency, South Says, I.P.S., Sept. 23, 
2005; Sanjay Suri, Straight Talk Expected at Post-Helsinki Roundtables, 
I.P.S., Sept. 12, 2005 (Schifferes).  
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reserves, in part so they don’t have to go begging to the IMF.  
Argentina defaulted and otherwise took a hard line against the IMF 
and private creditors, yet this resulted in only a three-month 
depression.  Argentina amounted to a huge loss of IMF influence, a 
bluff well and truly called on the cut-down-to-size IMF leader of a 
“creditors’ cartel” of other multilateral creditors, rich countries, 
and the private sector.  The Group of 20 (G20) rich and developing 
countries describes the need for the IMF to improve governance, 
strategy, and operations, and to reform their quotas (which govern 
particular countries’ capacity to borrow.)  The IMF seems to 
understand the need to increase its legitimacy through such 
reforms, plus expanding developing country influence in the IMF, 
introducing transparency, and forbearing from attaching stability- 
and development-endangering conditions  to IMF loans.144 We 
shall see. 
 The legally-guaranteed separatism of the IMF and the WB, 
which are accountable (pro rata) to the countries providing loan 
funds, and of the World Trade Organization (WTO), accountable 
to its 148 members, means that global development policies are not 
integrated or coordinated by the Secretary General, the World 
Summit, or anyone else.  The Doha Round of the WTO 
negotiations (lodged in quasi-authoritarian Qatar, to minimize anti-
WTO demonstrations) has regularly been on the brink of collapse 
since 2003, with too much finger-pointing (insignificant bets, 
perceived as such) and too little leadership (as the poker metaphor 
leads us to expect).  Doha is the first real chance for developing 
countries to engage in trade negotiations that might enhance their 
economic growth, reductions in poverty145, and perhaps curb some 
of the market fundamentalisms of the previous, Uruguay Round. 
 Three main ‘games’ are being played separately and 
together in Doha, inconclusively and over long periods: (1) 
liberalizing farm trade, the most distorted of global trade sectors; 
(2) liberalizing trade in services, chiefly in the banking, medical, 
and accounting sub-sectors; and (3) decreasing industrial tariffs, 
 
144 Atara, supra note 127; Balls and McGregor; Hart & Pottinger; 
Lachman; Schifferes, supra note ___;  Weisbrodt; G20 Nations. 
 
145 Farmer’s Friend; In the Rough.  See Martinez (as of Oct. 2005, the 
Doha process is already two years behind schedule). 
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measures which the E.U. in particular is keen for developing 
countries to implement.  These seem to be negative-sum poker 
games: meager winnings by developed countries do not seem to 
wash their losses, while developing countries are hanging in there 
as of this writing, but with their betting resources dissipated.  The 
clearest example of an ordinary poker occurs in  negotiations over 
liberalizing trade in services.  These have led to decentralized 
results, with different countries betting on different deals in what 
amounts to separate games.  This would also be the outcome from 
a total collapse of the Doha Round, with rich countries able to pick 
off poor ones one-by-one (i.e., “bet” more than poor countries can 
afford to “call”) while creating bilateral trade treaties.  ‘Advanced 
poker’ is structured to avoid such a collapse and thereby stay 
within the broader Doha “game” geared toward fairer and more 
broadly acceptable rules (rather than a simple Uruguay Round rush 
to further liberalizations), if the poorer countries can only find their 
way back to this ‘advanced poker.’  The apparent Doha deadline is 
mid-2007, when President Bush’s “fast track” authority ends: i.e., 
the Senate must vote to ratify the Doha agreement or not until mid-
2007, without introducing protectionist amendments that favor 
particular constituents.146 
Middle-income countries like Brazil and India refuse to 
budge on  (2) services, and especially on (3) industrial tariffs, 
where they want to protect fragile local industries, absent 
significant progress on (1), their access to the agricultural markets 
of developed countries.  Annual farm subsidies amount to $19 
billion in the U.S. and $75 billion in the E.U. (with protectionist 
Japan hiding behind these major players), locally-popular barriers 
which are difficult for agricultural products from poor, developing, 
and even middle-income countries to leap over.  The U.S. bet 
 
146 See Ragavan, In The Rough, supra note ___; The Trade Game (using 
two party, one issue game, discussed in notes ___ and accompanying 
text, supra, to model the Doha Round).  The WB estimates the (scaled-
back) benefit of a successful Doha Round to developing countries at $20-
30 billion per year.  But see also Arndt, supra note ___ (one study shows 
projected benefits and adjustment costs to be relatively small in 
Mozambique); Filo & Harridge (a successful Doha’s “positive but rather 
small” effects on the structure of poverty and income distribution in 
Brazil). 
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significant farm subsidy reductions in an ostensible attempt to 
break the Doha gaming deadlock, but the E.U. (and especially 
France) refuses to match (or “call”) the U.S. bet.  The U.S. can 
thus be said to have “called” the E.U.’s “bluff” over development 
being a “core” value (or source of prestige) within E.U. foreign 
policy.  But it is widely known that Congress is unlikely to 
underwrite the U.S. Trade Representative’s bet.  It is even reported 
that the 32 poorest WTO members have had trouble agreeing on a 
common position, despite their not being required to make 
concessions during negotiations.147 
At the December 2005 Hong Kong Summit, expectations 
were low that a meaningful framework agreement for the Doha 
Round would be created.  Philip Bowring gave this Summit a low 
but not failing grade, since it showed developing countries to be 
more dedicated trade liberalizers than are their developed 
counterparts.148 NGOs like Oxfam and Greenpeace were very 
critical, and the behavior of demonstrators—mostly South Korean 
farmers—was mirrored inside the hall by E.U. representatives.  
110 developing countries united in a historic first for the WTO, in 
an effort to make the Round the development round it was 
supposed to be.  Their efforts failed, since no meaningful access to 
the agricultural markets of developing countries resulted.  
Developed countries agreed to eliminate agricultural export 
subsidies by 2013 (by 2006 for cotton), but export subsidies are a 
small fraction of total U.S./E.U. farm subsidies.  Their quotas and 
tariffs will be done away with in 2008 for the 50 least developed 
countries, but the U.S. has already said that it will likely exempt 
 
147 Beattie, Poorer; Bianchi, E.U. Lender; French Monkey (France has 
bullied E.U. partners into a “trade cowardice”); id. (Does France want 
the “unilateralist” blame for entrenching poverty?); Stopped Clock.  See 
Beattie, Ct; The Trade Game, supra note __.  The existing WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture has Special safeguards provisions (special 
import restrictions for certain types of “emergencies”) which developing 
countries would like to prohibit developed countries from using. 
148 Philip Bowring, Silver Lining in WTO Talks, INT. HERALD TRIB., 
Dec. 19, 2005.  See Don Lee, Delegates Eke Out a Trade Deal, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005 (a Hong Kong failure would have damaged WTO 
credibility while it contends with the proliferation of bilateral trade 
agreements, growing global economic imbalances, and growing 
protectionist sentiment in developed countries). 
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textiles and apparel from this abolition.  Developing countries hope 
to recover ground lost in Hong Kong by influencing drafting 
committees and entering into plurilateral negotiations over 
agreements on agricultural market access—with services as the 
new battleground of negotiation.149 
To provide counterpoint to this Doha/Hong Kong quasi-
anarchy, and to round out the picture of multilateral development 
efforts, the World Summit also called for the reform of the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and implementation of 
the Hyogo Framework to reduce disaster relief response times, 
improve disaster prevention measures and early warning systems, 
and secure more food supplies for disasters which are less tied to 
donors’ conditions.  The global response to the South Pacific 
tsunami seemed adequate, with the U.N. playing an important but 
far from exclusive role because the U.S., Australia, and a few 
others doubted U.N. efficiency, but hurricanes in Central and 
South America, famine in Niger, and the earthquake in Kashmir 
illustrate donor inattention and “fatigue”, and a shortage of U.N. 
resources.  Such disasters will negate development efforts in 
affected countries for many years to come, unless creative 
programs and a great deal of money are forthcoming.  The new 
High-Level Commission for the Legal Empowerment of the Poor, 
apparently not considered by the World Summit, has Hernando de 
Soto and Madeline Albright as co-Commissioners.  It is likely to 
not be a mere substitute for doing something: de Soto’s legally-
defined property rights ‘movement’ is increasingly accepted as the 
best means of transition from an informal economy and into a 
measure of entrepreneurship.  There is currently $9.3 trillion worth 
of unregistered land and equipment worldwide, which can be 
levered into additional wealth, security for loans, etc., through 
registration and the other means that the Commission will 
consider.150 
149 Id.; Gustavo Capdevila, Back to Work in the WTO, With Empty 
Hands, I.P.S., Dec. 30, 2005; Lee, supra note 148; Ramesh Jaura, 
Historic Union in Hong Kong, I.P.S., Dec. 16, 2005.  See id.: (The 50 
least developed countries, 34 of which are in Africa, hold 12.5% of 
world population but account for only 0.5% of world trade). 
150 Chaufen; U.N. Calls.  The U.N.’s emergency relief coordinator, Jan 
Egeland, proposes additional reforms: a central fund (to which the U.S. 
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The Games Continue 
 
In the wake of the World Summit, the new General 
Assembly (G.A.) President, Eliasson of Sweden, said members 
were busy mapping negotiating positions (as you might expect, 
structuring new poker games in effect), and dealing with matters 
that take precedence: setting up the Peacebuilding Commission and 
the Human Rights Council that must be in place by the end of 
2005[!], and with a terrorism convention to be finished by the end 
of the current G.A. session in September 2006.  The crucial 
definition of “terrorism” continues to be contentious, with some 
members continuing their efforts to protect the rights of self-
determination and to resist occupation that some opponents see as 
“terrorism” among, e.g., Palestinians.  In late November, a speech 
by U.S. Ambassador Bolton gave the U.N. “its usual warning” 
from the U.S.: ‘Do what we say or we will send you into 
oblivion.’151 Annan’s comment is “I am not the interpreter of 
Ambassador Bolton”, and an American reader of the Bolton-ian tea 
leaves sees the U.S. continuing to seek “multilateral cover for 
unilateral and illegal U.S. interventions….”152 As 2005 drew to a 
 
will not contribute) and other ways to leave relief less “overstretched.”  
Imogen Foulkes, U.N. Urges Disaster Response Reform, BBC NEWS,
Nov. 23, 2005, 01:33 GMT. 
 
151 Thalif Deen, U.N. Faces New Political Threats From the U.S., I.P.S., 
Nov. 23, 2005 (quoting Global Policy Forum’s Jim Paul, who apparently 
paraphrases Bolton). 
152 Id. (quoting Annan and Institute for Policy Studies’ Phyllis Bennis 
respectively).  See General Assembly President Outlines Progress on 
U.N. World Summit Issues, U.N. NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 17, 2005 (read off 
<un.org/news>) (quoting and citing Eliasson).  The U.S. seeks to 
disempower the G.A. and make Annan’s successors accountable to 
Washington as “glorified CEOs”.  Deen, U.N. Faces, supra note 151 
(quoting Bennis and Paul).  Many of the Secretary-General’s top staff 
has been replaced by active supporters of the U.S. agenda, but Annan has 
retained some independence nonetheless.  Id. (quoting Bennis).  The net 
effect is more belligerent but otherwise not very different from Clinton’s 
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close, the U.N. could not approve its 2006-07 budget because of 
the implicit U.S. threat to withhold funds if members do not enact 
the “radical” reforms the U.S. seeks, especially in administration.  
(The occurred after the U.S. was rather disengaged from the 
September World Summit that created so much “fudge and 
mush.”)  Jeffrey Laurenti attributes this stance to Bush’s “foreign 
policy schizophrenia”, also termed his “bipolar” isolationism.153 
The Group of 77, discussed in the next paragraph, refused to rush 
into decision under threats from U.S. neoconservatives, taking the 
position that later reforms can be paid for under supplementary 
budgets.  This led Bolton, that comfortable contrarian who 
reportedly “speak{s} power to truth,”154 to propose a three-month 
budget, and that the U.S. could and would solve global problems 
by turning to mechanisms other than the U.N.’s.  A two-year 
budget was approved unanimously late in December, with a 
spending cap (backed by the U.S., the E.U., and Japan), that runs 
out in about six months unless reforms are adopted, reforms which 
Annan would restrict to those passed by the September World 
Summit.155 
From the other side, the 132-member Group of 77 
developing countries, plus China, is holding up work on the 
Human Rights Council (along with a smaller group of repressive 
regimes which fear being called to account) because Bolton wants 
 
“assertive multilateralism”, where Madeline Albright famously called the 
U.N. “a tool of American foreign policy.”  Id. (quoting Bennis). 
153 Jeffrey Laurenti, Schizophrenic Administration Heightens U.S. 
Isolation, MAXIMS NEWS NETWORK, Dec. 29, 2005. 
154 Id. 
155 Thalif Deen, U.N. Threatened With Budgetary Showdown, I.P.S., 
Dec. 21, 2005; Maggie Farley, U.N. Hit By a Bolt From the Right, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005; Warren Hoge, Official Says American Delay of 
U.N. Budget Would Cause Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2005; Edith 
Lederer, U.S. Stands Alone in the U.N. Budget Demand, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 2, 2005, 7:03 P.M.; Laurenti, supra note 153; 
Betsy Pisik, U.S. Budget Plan for U.N. Criticized, WASHINGTON TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2005; Mark Turner, U.N. Risks Severe Financial Crisis Over 
Threat to Block Budget, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005;  Editorial: 
Blocking Reform at the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2005; U.N. Members 
Approve Two-Year Budget, CBS NEWS, Dec. 24, 2005 (read off 
<CBSNews.com>). 
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the Council.  The G77 is also protesting a cost-cutting shrinkage in 
Palestinian programs, and provoking showdowns, with the U.N. 
Secretariat over administrative reforms and over who will be 
Secretary-General Annan’s successor.  Annan will establish a Rule 
of Law Unit in the Secretariat, and order a review of several G.A. 
committees which he thinks have outlived their usefulness and 
mandates concerning, e.g., management and the budget of the U.N. 
secretariat.  He thinks “misunderstandings” led to the G77 charge 
that he was engaged in a “grab for power”; it is the U.N. members’ 
“prerogative to decide what should be cut and what should be 
rejected.”156 Annan then accused the G77 of interference in day-
to-day Secretariat operations, and of violating the U.N. Charter by 
politicizing the Secretariat.  The G77 fears that reforms will be 
funded by transfers from human rights and development programs.  
World Health Organization employees threaten a work stoppage to 
protest reorganization plans, despite threats that this will lead to 
their being fired.157 
In other words, business (or ordinary poker) continues as 
usual at the U.N.: the lack of public information and advocacy, 
plus the chronic preference for a narrow and short-term self-
interest, leaves almost all of us, including most World Summiteers, 
unable to see an admittedly complex “big picture.”  This picture 
can usefully be defined as the need for active pursuit of Annan’s 
interdependent “four pillars” of peace, security, development, and 
human rights.  Pursuit or non-pursuit of these pillars will affect 
almost everyone in the long run, and a failure to recognize and deal 
with this fact could reverse the trend toward world civilization.  As 
 
156 Thalif Deen, U.N. Chief Denies Making a “Grab for Power”, I.P.S., 
Nov. 22, 2005.  Thalif Deen, Developing Nations Fault U.N. Reform 
Plan, I.P.S., Nov. 10, 2005; Deen, Move to Shrink Palestinian Programs 
Spurs Protest, I.P.S., Nov. 30, 2005; Colum Lynch, Campaigns to 
Succeed Annan at U.N. Are Underway, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 26, 
2005, A22; U.N. Members Approve, supra note 155. 
157 Deen, U.N. Chief, supra note 65 (quoting Annan).  See Andrew Jack, 
WHO Staff to Stop Work Over Shake-Up, I.P.S., Nov. 30, 2005; Pisik, 
supra note 155. 
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Tony Blair argued, we need a better understanding of how self-
interest and mutual interest are inextricably linked.158 
Improved cooperation, described here as a commitment to 
the liberal internationalism rules of a sustained ‘advanced poker’, 
enables the players to draw (and bet on) simultaneously self- and 
mutually-interested links among  development, trade, security, 
human rights, environmental protection, migration (a major 
concern in the U.S. and E.U.), etc.  Hurricane Katrina showed 
Americans that cooperation is needed to reduce feelings of job 
insecurity and of vulnerability to disaster and violence; and also to 
deal with corrupt, fragile and/or incompetent governments.  The 
poorer the nation, the more likely is a plague of violence which 
reinforces poverty and the other evils that operate to deny a human 
dignity.  Even President Bush spoke of a “moral duty” to recognize 
interrelatedness and the need to cooperate (admittedly, to pursue 
his anti-terrorism strategy), during his September 2005 speech to 
the World Summit.  For most other countries, the U.N. is a 
necessary, often the most competent, partner for the pursuit of vast, 
interrelated responsibilities.  This is why World Summit failures on 
non-proliferation, human rights, and development, and the partial 
successes concerning intervention and administrative reforms, are 
so tragic.  Peacebuilding is the only genuine Summit success, and 
the paucity of useful proposals concerning terrorism and the 
composition of the Security Council mean that lack of progress in 
these areas is a good thing.  The Summit at least offers a starting 
point for continued reforms, if members can understand Summit 
failures and develop the will to achieve consensus-by-compromise.  
As Annan remarks rather optimistically, “reform is a process, not 
an event.”159 
158 Farley, U.N. Reform, supra note 65; M.S. Haq, President Bush’s 
Address at the U.N. Has Made the World’s Poor More Hopeful, THE 
[BANGLADESH] NEW NATION, Oct. 2, 2005, 11:37 (an excellent article); 
Frederick Studemann, Blair to Call for Global Trade Agreement, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 13, 2005, 22:00; Can Its Credibility Be 
Repaired, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2005, at 30.  Annan is fond of 
“pillars”: cf. his 3 pillars, note 120, supra.
159 Farley, U.N. Reform, supra note 65 (quoting Annan).  See Stefania 
Bianchi, E.U. Presents its Plan for the Poor, I.P.S., Sept. 21, 2005, 03:23 
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REMEDIES?
The once-in-a-generation opportunity for wholesale U.N. 
reform160 at the 2005 World Summit having mostly failed, what 
are the prospects for piecemeal reforms in the future?  The answer 
is both “excellent” and “poor.”  Governance without a government 
creates many outcomes “balanced between no longer and not 
yet,”161 and a consensus over smaller changes to this unwieldy 
state of affairs is easy to achieve in theory.  But there is little basis 
for negotiation (game-playing) without a fairly large number of 
significant proposals on the table, to trade off against each other.  
Otherwise, with relatively little to lose, major players and 
coalitions of minor ones, easily manipulate (usually veto) new 
negotiated legal orders (rules which require a strong consensus to 
take effect), especially by changing the game from ‘advanced’ to 
ordinary poker—as has been argued.  Reforms are especially 
unlikely so long as the world’s hegemonic power (the U.S.) 
provokes determined opposition by so easily and regularly setting 
international laws aside whenever its short-term interests are 
perceived as advanced by such a play.  This tactic cannot long 
endure within a rational international politics, however: along with 
Europeans, the U.S. benefits the most from a stable and 
functioning international legal order.162 
GMT; Alston, supra note 117, at 826; Holland, supra note __; Kessler, 
supra note 23; Mitchell, supra note 75; Ward, Frechette, supra note 47. 
160 But see Robert Samuelson, Seduced by ‘Reform”, WASHINGTON 
POST, June 2, 2004, A25 (“reform” is “a public relations tool—a 
convenient label” slapped on “proposals to claim the high moral 
ground.”); id. (self-labeled reformers “aim to stigmatize adversaries as 
nasty, wrongheaded, selfish or misinformed.”).  These are tactics widely 
used at the U.N. 
161 LUHMANN, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 17, at 66 (discussing 
outcomes from a multiplicity of his “subsystems” which are arguably 
like the U.N. “family”—note 1 and accompanying text, supra).  See 
OBSERVATIONS at 18, 27. 
162 Clare Short: Depression and Mistrust Prevail at the U.N., THE 
INDEPENDENT, Sept. 16, 2005;   
 (quoting Clare Short); Coate, supra note 1.  See note 70 and 
accompanying text, supra (Mark Malloch Brown, on the indispensability 
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A useful metaphor for discussing feasible smaller reforms 
is based on the Fasces deployed in Republican Rome—and also in 
Imperial Rome and Mussolini’s Italy (hence “fascism”), alas.  The 
Fasces is a bundle of sticks, with each stick representing an aspect 
of governance.  The sticks are bound together with leather straps 
and an axe head is inserted at the top—to represent coercive 
capacities.  Each member of the U.N. “family” would have a 
different Fasces, reflecting the different aspects of governance 
they possess, but none of these Fasces have enough of the right 
kind of sticks to reflect a government.  Apart from the Security 
Council’s under circumstances that rarely obtain, the axe heads are 
variously small and dull for each U.N. organ, reflecting modest 
capacities in the areas of implementation and enforcement.  The 
point is that particular governance reform sticks, and even better 
axe heads, can be added to particular U.N. Fasces without raising 
the spectre of a global government, and with little observable 
effect on nation-state sovereignty.  For most economists, a world 
government would create unbearably high agency costs (given a 
global heterogeneity of preferences) and enforcement costs.  Such 
costs would likely negate the welfare gains such a government 
would create.   
 The steady centralization of nation-state power that 
followed the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia is now being reversed, as 
variously predicted by Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” (1795), Marx’s 
“withering away of the state” and Bertrand Russell in the 1060s.  
Sovereign equality has always been implausible, and the 
Westphalian system of self-help had to be tempered by 
(‘advanced’ poker) rules and institutions, to avert disasters as 
conflicts grew more deadly over time.  National governments 
increasingly share power with multinational corporations, other 
NGOs, and globalized markets, as well as with international 
organizations.  Even so, the nation-state remains the only 
institution with an automatic right of membership in the world 
community—as a “player.”  Any theoretical loss of an 
increasingly-theoretical sovereignty due to small U.N. reforms is 
 
of reform coalitions).  See also Brinkbaumer & Mascolo, supra note 79: 
“a morally-oriented international community did not exist before the 
Asian tsunami of 2004.  {A}fter … three months of solidarity, 
everything returned to normal.  Id. 
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unlikely to be noticed, much less attributed to small U.N. 
reforms.163 (Even American neoconservatives are not vigilant in 
this regard.) 
 Smaller reforms can be described as the 
constitutionalization of particular practices, to further entrench a 
liberal internationalism (or ‘advanced’ poker).  There are costs to 
forming each constitutional consensus of course, but fundamental 
‘game’ changes may make a consensus easier to form.  Through 
new treaties, modifying old ones, or confidently proclaiming new 
customary international laws—an unwritten constitution—the 
constitutional goals should be to expand rather than foreclose 
opportunities, through broader and more open channels of 
communication.  Information would then flow more widely to 
players and the public, and rapid global changes could be 
embodied in legal changes more accurately.  Adding escape 
clauses judiciously, and new means of buffering widely, would 
reduce tensions among the players.164 An excellent article by Joel 
Tractman165 explores the most thoroughly-constitutionalized of the 
U.N. family, the World Trade Organization.  He finds six 
constitutional dimensions, which are necessarily interrelated and 
related to WTO members’ desires and domestic constitutions: an 
economic governance of exchanges of value and authority; an 
integration of many (but not all) social values; a political reflection 
of the “cultural and democratic integrity of a group”; a legal 
definition of the scope of legislative, judicial (I would substitute 
dispute resolution), and social interaction processes; a human 
rights limitation on nation-state authority; and a redistribution 
 
163 Coate, supra note 1; Peter Drucker, The Global Economy and the 
Nation-State, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 1997 (all FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
articles are read off <cfr.org>); Jessica Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 1997.  See Posner, supra note 8 (while the status quo 
will likely prevail, moderate legal revisions are possible); Yoo, supra 
note 8 (despite the “almost inviolable” U.N. Charter presumption of state 
sovereignty, states must—except in the case of self-defense—delegate 
the use of force to the U.N., in “a law enforcement paradigm”).  But see 
Posner: the collective action problem of decentralized enforcement is 
often solved through a self-help. 
164 See JACKSON, supra note 19, at 120-21, 216, 350, 355, 445-46, 459. 
165 Joel Tractman, The WTO Constitution: Toward Tertiary Rules for 
Intertwined Elephants (2005) (S.S.R.N. Paper No. 815764). 
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founded on social solidarity.166 I would argue that the 
combination of WTO structures and members’ desires operates to 
emphasize economic growth at the expense of the functions of 
human rights, redistributive/labor, and environmental 
constitutions.  As reformulated, Tractman’s approach arguably 
serves as a (perhaps too complex) template for the further 
constitutionalization of other U.N. agencies.  Better monitoring 
techniques/institutions would reduce collective action problems by 
reducing the opportunism of hidden agendas and ploys (i.e., 
cheating at poker).  This, plus substantive means for fleshing out 
and incentivizing an enlightened, longer-term self-interest, would 
enhance the cooperation on which an ‘advanced’ poker depends. 
 Constitutionalization turns mere voting into an 
abandonment of the survival of the fittest, into some value system 
which goes beyond a simple welfare (or warfare) maximization by 
and for elites.  Under pressures on the U.N.—through NGO 
“audits” of various agencies and (inevitably partial) mobilizations 
of public opinion, but not by the 2005 World Summit that (perhaps 
inevitably) left the powerful Security Council in its oligarchic 
place—this value system slowly evolves in democratic directions.  
Inclusion, participation and, less directly, transparency, 
accountability, and distinctive sources of legitimacy, spawn a 
growing resistance toward the exclusionary games of ordinary 
poker.  But democratization is only in its infancy at the WTO, the 
IMF, the World Bank, etc.  Democratic tendencies do not 
necessarily generate respect for minority rights (a weaker form of 
self-determination), and democratic tendencies can also generate 
unpredictable, incoherent and, as in Serbia, illiberal outcomes.  
Despite such potential defects, the popularity as well as the 
importance of these artifacts of an international democracy suggest 
that, with creativity and courage, the General Assembly could use 
them to reclaim its place as the most important U.N. body.  
Democratization faces more opposition that does a ‘mere’ 
constitutionalization, from major players (perhaps excluding the 
U.N.) that deem unaccountability and poker-like secrecy as 
essential to pursuing their elaborate schemes.  For this reason, the 
 
166 Id.  Tractman properly treats the WTO as “semi-autonomous”, a 
characterization which requires complex analyses of the rest of the U.N. 
law and of domestic constitutional orders.  Id. 
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collectively quite powerful minor players and most NGOs support 
democratization as a partial equalizer for the major players’ wealth 
and power.167 
As mentioned before, the complexity, instability, 
uncertainty, and incoherence of much of the international law that 
revolves around the U.N. family does not stem from an 
international anarchy.  Rather, it is characteristic of the governance 
without government that has been modeled here as  outcomes of 
the leaderless, self-organized “ordinary” poker games.  The 
players’ interest gets exhausted over who wins and who loses what 
and when, with little attention being paid to coordination of the 
outcomes.  Integration of the unwieldy and unevenly-developed 
international law rules seems more difficult than a 
constitutionalization and even a democratization.  Greater 
cooperation (more of an ‘advanced’ poker) is essential, and the 
World Wide Web offers one model of how this could be 
 
167 Alston, supra note 117, at 790-1; Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, 
The Alternative U.N, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Sept. 2005; Thalif 
Deen, U.N.’s Authority Tested By Perils Ahead, IPS, Dec. 27, 2005.  See 
JACKSON, supra note 19, at 216;  LUHMANN, LAW, supra note 17, at 304, 
347; WALZER, supra note 33, at 180-81; Alston, at 811 (discussions of 
participation which are not tied to a concrete law or policy are, “hollow 
and tokenistic”); Ignatius, They’re Not, supra note 37 (quoting the leader 
of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood) (the U.S. wants democracy only as an 
“artistic decoration”, since truly fair elections would threaten Israeli and 
U.S. interests); Adrian Karatnycky, Zigging and Zagging Toward 
Democracy, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 15, 2005, at A21 (durable 
domestic democracies maintain the discipline of nonviolent civic action 
and are led by broadly-based civil coalitions which force splits within the 
ruling elite and its security forces); Marincola, Summit Ignores, supra 
note 68 (quoting Antonio Papisca) (“It is impossible to speak of 
international democracy and democratisation within making reference to 
the institutional spheres in which they can actually be pursued.”); 
Tractman, supra note 165 (discussing the “democracy deficit” at the 
international level); Democracy’s Ten-Year Rut, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 
29, 2005, 39-40 (“Latin Americans do not want to go back to their 
dictatorships but they are still unimpressed with their democracies.”); id. 
(only 26% feel they “are equal before the law—the same number as in 
1998.”); id. (mistrust of political institutions leads Latin Americans 
frequently to take to the streets); note 29, supra (collapse of Bush’s 
democracy initiative in the Middle East). 
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accomplished: relatively few rules which (almost) everyone can 
support because they permit diverse content, and few nodes but 
many links which can be ‘Googled’ to solve legal disputes and 
other problems.  John Jackson offers a legal frame for such a 
model: “plurilateral” agreements, which integrate an economic 
globalization with environmental concerns, for example.168 
Agreements could also integrate economic globalization with 
human rights, self-determination with other human rights, etc.  
With sustained advocacy from NGOs, such agreements could form 
the base of a pyramid of international law among the willing, with 
increasingly-general integrations emerging at the higher levels of 
the pyramid.  However, this is open to the criticism that it reverts 
to the “a la carte” international law that multilateral agreements are 
designed to avoid, and it is thus unlikely that such agreements 
would even generate a customary international law.  A fuller 
integration presumably requires a powerful specialist agency, a 
Global Law Organization.  Akin to a treaty-based WTO, this GLO 
could manage “trade” (and tradeoffs) in law, by integrating the 
diverse values created through a decentralized rule-making169, as 
well as through constitutionalization, democratization, and new 
checks and balances (if any) as well. 
 Adapted from Montesquieu, checks and balances are an 
American and (somewhat) French curb on the powers of 
governance, and an alternative to a concentration of powers—the 
monarch in Parliament under the British model, for example.  It 
can be convincingly argued that (almost all) U.N. powers are too 
weak to require additional checks and balances that increase the 
costs of forming a consensus; things are unlikely to “get out of 
hand” in the future.  This is because a fair number of informal 
checks and balances already exist: means of settling disputes 
peaceably; practices that screen out much of the abuse that would 
 
168 See notes ___ and accompanying text, supra.
169 JACKSON, supra note 19, at 412.  See Hirsch, supra note 17; Carlos 
Vasquez, Trade Sanctions and Human Rights—Past, Present, and 
Future 6 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 797, 831 (___) (agreements could permit but 
not require states to impose trade sanctions for human rights violations).  
But see Andrew Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: 
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. 
INT’L. L. 639, 641, 644 (1998). 
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otherwise occur, through generalized injunctions of cooperation 
(conducive to an ‘advanced’ poker); and (modest) restraints on the 
use of a naked wealth and power.  The most notable check would 
be called “federalism”, if government(s) existed at the international 
level.170 
As ‘players’ wealthy multinational cooperations, other 
major NGOs, and nation-states, channel and condition the creation 
of international laws through their game-plays.  Probably as a 
necessary concession to reality, major players  can veto many 
(game-) initiatives.  To the extent that nation-state (and some 
NGO) policies are indeed devised democratically, this lends an 
indirect democracy to international processes.  A few U.N. reforms 
spelling out relative competences could reinforce the “subsidiarity” 
principle that aids in the management of complexity: assign a task 
to the lowest level of governance that can most efficiently and 
humanely perform it, given that governance level’s degree of 
development.  International action should thus be, and largely is, 
reserved for those things where various levels of the relevant 
nation-states cannot or will not act: “externalities”, where these 
states are concerned.  Some of these externalities could be tamed 
by restraining the White House, if possible and necessary, and by a 
Global Law Organization (supra) which eliminates multiple legal 
overlaps.  To the extent that the distinction can be drawn, the 
politics of these externalities is for the members, and the 
administration (the monitoring, implementation, and enforcement 
of political decisions) is for the U.N. family that has often avoided 
accountability for its actions in the past.  The most sensitive topics 
here are empowering poor people and creating an (inevitably 
modest) redistribution on their behalf, especially in developing 
countries and where the plight of the poor is generated by the 
global markets beyond the control of most nation-states.171 
170 Tractman, supra note 165.  See id. (something like the GLO I 
propose could watch for imbalances among values within particular U.N. 
agencies, and seek to impose “redistribution” and human rights norms as 
expressions of social solidarity and as advancing a new international 
civilization).  On poker game outcomes as the kind of “noise” that can 
lead to institutional formation or reformation, see TURNER, supra note 
106, at 103, 127, 137-39, 146-47, 153. 
171 See JACKSON, supra note 19, at 454. 
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The monitoring, implementation, and the more centralized 
(based less on a self-help) enforcement of international political 
decisions require the displacement of governance through 
‘advanced’ as well as ordinary poker games, by an 
institutionalization which is an extrapolation from the 
constitutionalization discussed earlier.  Many U.N. institutions are 
thin, unbalanced, and thus incapable of promoting “thicker” human 
rights and developmental rights and duties, as well as promoting 
legality and justice generally—as solutions to collective action 
problems.172 Discussing the reasons why customary international 
humanitarian laws are violated, Abdul Korama describes a mixture 
of factors: the rules are unknown, known but inadequate, 
enforcement mechanisms are weak, and law is simply 
disregarded.173 These are the factors that reformed and thus 
stronger institutions must work on to reduce the number and 
seriousness of violations. 
 Pursuing a piecemeal reform process such as described 
here, we must learn to live with legal and political failures—as we 
describe them—and expect only small legal evolutions.  We have 
to ask the right questions, use hard-headed analysis rather than a 
“happy-think”, and take quick advantage of transcendent and 
incremental opportunities.  Above all, we should recognize that 
much of what we see as necessary or natural is really a matter of 
choice or context.  For example, dignitary human rights mean 
different things in different circumstances, and the seemingly-
unattainable Millennium Development Goals may merely give 
false hope, ignore the effects of the global distribution of wealth 
 
172 See id. at 275, 411-12, 423; Evans, supra note 48, at 1056; 
Tractman, supra note 165.  But see Evans, at 1062 (calling global 
“market discipline” a “counter-law” which, I would argue, is 
nevertheless conditioned heavily by the WTO/IMF/World Bank legal 
complex).  But see also Alston, supra note 117, at 791 (decentralization 
is required to “enhance poor people’s voice”); Glennon, supra note 19 
(“To reduce state miscreance it is necessary to reduce state power; 
countervailing (decent-concerns such as humanitarianism and state 
security are simply irrelevant.”). 
173 See Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, The Alternative U.N., LE
MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Sept. 2005; Brown & Benn, supra note 92; 
Godoy, supra note 66; Posner, supra note 8.  Abdul Korama, Forward, 
in Henckaerts & Oswald-Beck, supra note ___, at xii. 
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and power, be too selective, not go far enough, fail to attract a 
sufficient legitimacy to be implemented, etc. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article is no less complex that the global phenomena it 
tries to describe, phenomena of an insiders’ game—like poker.  
Rather than try to summarize these phenomena here, we should 
close with brief thoughts about the future.  After the 2005 World 
Summit, “many critics wrote the United Nations off as an 
institution so deeply flawed that it was beyond salvation.”174 This 
article takes a different, more nuanced view: despite political (or 
poker-playing) flaws, a creaking bureaucracy, and inadequate 
resources, the U.N. will play a rather uncertain yet critical role in 
solving global externalities/collective action problems—especially 
if piecemeal reforms are aggressively pursued.  Discussing 
international economic law while paraphrasing Heraclites, Andreas 
Lowenfeld argues that “nothing is permanent except change”175,
and that most international law of the U.N. is followed most of the 
time.176 Philip Alston is right to worry that the “U.N. approach of 
indivisibility” will become a “tautology”177 or perhaps a cliché, yet 
it currently offers a “big picture” with which to confront nation-
state players busy totaling up their poker winnings and losses. 
 Will the U.N. create a “networked world?  A Global 
Neighborhood Watch?  Managed Globalization?”  Are there other 
facets “to think about and support an integrated response” from 
voters and policymakers?178 Through reform, will the U.N. family 
slowly create freedoms from want and fear, and otherwise preserve 
our common humanity?  Can new collaborative arrangements 
 
174 Alston, supra note 117, at 762-65; Glennon, supra note 19; Paul & 
Nahory, supra note 85. 
175 Andrew Mack, Peace on Earth? Increasingly, Yes, WASHINGTON 
POST, Dec. 28, 2005, A21. 
176 ANDREAS LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 43 (____). 
See Lederer, Global Violence, supra note 54; LOWENFELD, supra note 
__, at 148. 
177 Alston, supra note 117, at 784-85. 
178 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Shadow World, WASHINGTON POST,
Oct. 30, 2005, BW6 (reviewing MOISS NAM, ILLICIT: HOW SMUGGLERS,
TRAFFICKERS, AND COPYCATS ARE HIJACKING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY). 
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make better use of everybody’s expertise, and of our other 
resources, in discovering new opportunities and addressing new 
threats?179 Some or all of these futures are plausible, but one thing 
is clear: to change the U.N., “we must change too.”180 The most 
important and difficult change is to stiffen political will at the 
nation-state level, to resist the temptation to create law through an 
ordinary poker—in pursuit of unstable, short-term, and sometimes-
misperceived gains—by decreasing the incentives so to defect 
from ‘advanced’ poker—where incentives must be increased.181 
APPENDIX: THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND 
TARGETS (Alston, supra note ___, at 828-29). 
 
Goal 1:  Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
• Target 1:  Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people whose income is less than one dollar a day. 
 
• Target 2:  Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people who suffer from hunger. 
 
179 Romulo, supra note __.  See Alston, supra note 117, at 772 (quoting 
Christian Tormuschat): “If human life and dignity are not protected, the 
idea of a legal order would collapse” —at least in the liberal tradition.  
Law-as-ordinary-poker is thus dangerous because it is not biased toward 
dignity-enhancing outcomes. 
180 Thoroor, supra note ___. 
181 One aspect of law-as-poker is the effect it may have on ethnic or 
religious identity.  Law-as-poker may accelerate the obsolescence of a 
variety of ‘traditional’ practices, while paying lip-service to diversity, 
and may render discourse over law—based on John Rawls’s 
“overlapping consensus” for example—as cheap game-bets no one 
listens to because legal content does not matter much.  See JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (___) (“overlapping consensus”).  Sticking your 
national neck out by assuming a human rights obligation, for example, is 
often seen as, and sometimes is, a game-bet denoted to winning 
something quite different.  But see Alston, at 809.  To give Kofi Annan 
the last word: “We must find what President Franklin Roosevelt once 
called ‘the courage to fulfill our roles in an admittedly imperfect world.’”  
Kathryn Horvat and Pat Shea, The United Nations, 60 Years and Still 
Counting, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 26, 2005. 
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Goal 2:  Achieve universal primary education 
 
• Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys 
and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of 
primary schooling. 
 
Goal 3:  Promote gender equality and empower women 
 
• Target 4:  Eliminate gender disparity in primary and 
secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels 
of education no later than 2015. 
 
Goal 4:  Reduce child mortality 
 
• Target 5:  Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, 
the under-five mortality rate. 
 
Goal 5:  Improve maternal health 
• Target 6:  Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 
2015, the maternal morality ratio. 
 
Goal 6:  Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
• Target 7:  Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the 
spread of HIV/AIDS. 
 
• Target 8:  Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the 
incidence of malaria and other major diseases. 
 
Goal 7:  Ensure environmental sustainability 
• Target 9:  Integrate the principles of sustainable 
development into country policies and programmes and 
reverse the loss of environmental resources. 
 
• Target 10:  Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people 
without sustainable access to safe drinking water. 
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• Target 11:  By 2020, to have achieved a significant 
improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum 
dwellers. 
Goal 8:  Develop a Global Partnership for Development 
Some of the indicators listed below will be monitored separately 
for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked 
countries and small island developing States. 
 
• Target 12:  Develop further an open, rule-based, 
predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial 
system. 
 
• Target 13: Address the Special Needs of the Least 
Developed Countries. 
 
• Target 14:  Address the Special Needs of landlocked 
countries and small island developing states. 
 
• Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of 
developing countries through national and international 
measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long 
term. 
 
• Target 16: In co-operation with developing countries, 
develop and implement strategies for decent and productive 
work for youth. 
 
• Target 17: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, 
provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing 
countries. 
 
• Target 18: In co-operation with the private sector, make 
available the benefits of new technologies, especially 
information and communications. 
